On the Threshold of \u3cem\u3eWainwright v Sykes:\u3c/em\u3e Federal Habeas Court Scrutiny of State Procedural Rules and Rulings by Michigan Law Review
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 83 Issue 5 
1985 
On the Threshold of Wainwright v Sykes: Federal Habeas Court 
Scrutiny of State Procedural Rules and Rulings 
Michigan Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michigan Law Review, On the Threshold of Wainwright v Sykes: Federal Habeas Court Scrutiny of State 
Procedural Rules and Rulings, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1393 (1985). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol83/iss5/4 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
NOTES 
On the Threshold of Wainwright v. Sykes: Federal Habeas 
Court Scrutiny of State Procedural Rules and Rulings 
Every state prisoner who petitions for federal habeas corpus relief1 
is entitled to an independent determination by the federal courts of the 
merits of his federal claim.2 When, however, the petitioner during his 
state trial failed to abide by a state procedural rule for preserving er-
ror, 3 he may well find that he cannot raise his claim before a habeas 
court. In Wainwright v. Sykes, 4 the United States Supreme Court 
barred habeas corpus review of a claim on which the petitioner "de-
faulted"5 in state court. Default on a state procedural rule was treated 
as an adequate and independent state ground for the state court deci-
sion, precluding review by the federal court of the federal claim. 
Under the rule announced in Sykes, habeas review is available only if 
1. Federal habeas corpus relief for state prisoners is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982). The 
statute provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain 
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Consti-
tution or laws or treaties of the United States. 
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to 
the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has 
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there either is an absence 
of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such process 
ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner. 
Other subsections of the statute define the term "exhaustion" of state remedies, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(c) (1982), specify when the habeas court must presume that factual findings by the state 
courts are correct, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d} (1982), and provide for the production and admission of a 
record of the state proceedings in the habeas court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e), (f) (1982). 
2. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). This statement holds true even when the 
state courts that entered and affirmed the petitioner's conviction have heard the identical claim 
on the merits. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 459 (1953); 344 U.S. at 499-500 (Frankfurter, 
J., separate opinion). The power of habeas courts to review state court holdings on the merits of 
federal questions is one of the few certainties in the changeable law surrounding the writ. On the 
mercurial nature of habeas corpus law, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 81 (noting the 
"Court's historic willingness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ"); 
Wright, Habeas Corpus: Its History and Its Future (Book Review), 81 MICH. L. REv. 802, 810 
(1983) ("[T]he single most striking fact about habeas corpus over the years has been its ability to 
change."). 
3. Such rules commonly require that the appellant bring his claim to the attention of the trial 
court, as by a timely motion or objection. See, e.g., COLO. R. CRIM. P. 33, 51; CONN. R. SUP. 
Cr. 3063; ILL. SUP. Cr. R. [ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A (1983)] 451(c). This Note does not 
distinguish between judicially and statutorily created state procedural rules. Nor have the courts 
distinguished the two. See, e.g., Runnels v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1363 n.4 (10th Cir. 1981). 
4. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
5. A "defaulted" claim is one which was not properly raised and preserved according to state 
procedural laws or rules. This Note employs the terms "defaulted" or "forfeited" rather than the 
term "waived." See note 30 infra. 
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the petitioner can show both "cause" for failing to comply with the 
state procedural rule and "prejudice" resulting from the inability to 
raise the claim. 6 
In requiring a federal habeas court to determine whether it is faced 
with an adequate state procedural ground for decision that properly 
bars habeas review, Sykes, in effect, requires federal habeas courts to 
distinguish between state court decisions based on procedure and 
those based on the merits. If the source of the state court's affirmance 
of the petitioner's conviction is procedural, the Sykes test applies and 
review will be barred absent the requisite showing of cause and preju-
dice. If, on the other hand, the state court affirms on the merits of the 
constitutional claim (whether or not the petitioner in fact committed 
any procedural default),7 independent review by the habeas court is 
appropriate. 
Subsequent practice has shown the Sykes cause-and-prejudice stan-
dard, from the point of view of the petitioner, to be very difficult to 
satisfy. 8 In most cases, the same procedural default that barred direct 
review of a defendant's claim in state court will also bar federal collat-
eral review. Because of this strict application and the broad scope9 of 
6. 433 U.S. at 87. The Sykes Court expressly declined to explain how the cause-and-preju-
dice test would operate. 433 U.S. at 87. 
7. When a state court has chosen to overlook a procedural default and has made a decision 
on the merits, all courts are agreed that there is "no warrant • • . for guarding state procedural 
rules more vigorously than the State itself does," and that the federal court may also examine the 
case on its merits. Phillips v. Smith, 552 F. Supp. 653, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (citation omitted), 
ajfd., 717 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984). See also Engle v. Isaac, 
456 U.S. 107, 135 n.44 (no federal review in such cases unless state court exercises its right to 
waive state procedural rule); Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87 ("[W]e deal only with contentions of federal 
law which were not resolved on the merits in the state proceeding due to respondent's failure to 
raise them there .•.. ") (emphasis added); Lockett v. Arn, 728 F.2d 266, 270 (6th Cir, 1984); 
Washington v. Harris, 650 F.2d 447, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 951 (1982); 
Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d lll, ll5 (6th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981). 
8. In Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130 (1982), for example, the Court held that "the futility 
of presenting an objection to the state courts cannot alone constitute cause" for failing to object 
to a jury instruction. This was so even though the Ohio jury instruction on burdens of proof had 
stood substantially unchanged and unchallenged for over a century before it was struck down 
(after petitioner's trial) by the Ohio Supreme Court. 456 U.S. at 110-11. This holding prompted 
Justice Brennan to remark that "on the Court's present view it will prove easier for a camel to go 
through the eye ofa needle than for a state prisoner to show 'cause.'" 456 U.S. at 144 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting). See also Wright, supra note 2, at 809 (meanings which have been given to the 
terms "cause" and "prejudice" are "not comforting to prisoners.''). 
More recently, however, Justice Brennan (writing for a 5-4 majority of the Court) did manage 
to lead his "camel" through the needle's eye. In Reed v. Ross, 104 S. Ct. 2901 (1984), the Court 
found "cause" for petitioner's failure to raise his Mullaney claim (see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 
U.S. 684 (1975)) at his trial in 1969. The Court held that "where a constitutional claim is so 
novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his 
failure to raise the claim in accordance with applicable state procedures.'' 104 S. Ct. at 2912. 
Engle, in which the Court reached the opposite conclusion with respect to the failure to raise a 
Mullaney claim in 1975, was distinguished on the ground that by that time the Court had de-
cided In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), that had been interpreted by "numerous courts" to 
require the prosecution to bear the burden of disproving certain affirmative defenses. 104 S. Ct. 
at 2912. 
9. Attempts by petitioners to limit the scope of the Sykes test have for the most part proved 
April 1985] Note - Procedural Bars to Habeas Corpus Review 1395 
the Sykes test, petitioners often seek to avoid application of the test 
entirely. When the reason for the state court's holding is even slightly 
ambiguous, a petitioner may attempt to circumvent the cause-and-
prejudice test by claiming that the decision rested on the merits of the 
claim, and not on the procedural default. He may also claim that the 
state court's ruling, although resting on a procedural default, is none-
theless not "adequate" to bar federal review. 
Broadly speaking, the subject of the present Note is neither the 
scope of "cause" nor the meaning of "prejudice." Rather, this Note 
examines specific problems which stand on the threshold of Wain-
wright v. Sykes. Resolution of these problems is necessary to deter-
unsuccessful. For example, the Court in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129 (1982), rejected peti-
tioners' contention that the Sykes test should be limited to claims in which the constitutional 
error does not affect the "truthfinding function" of trial courts. The factual context in which 
Sykes itself arose was a failure to object to the admission of a confession where the defendant 
allegedly had not understood his Miranda warning. The Sykes test has been applied, however, in 
cases presenting a broad range of procedural defaults. Defaults held to fall within the rule have 
included failures to make timely objections to the composition of a grand jury, Francis v. Hen-
derson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); see also note 23 infra (possible limitations of Francis), to the compo-
sition of a petit jury, Haggard v. Alabama, 550 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1977), to the admission of 
illegally obtained evidence, United States ex rel Maxey v. Morris, 591 F.2d 386, 391 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 912 (1979); Johnson v. Meacham, 570 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1978); Gates v. 
Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 840 (2d Cir. 1977) (Oakes, J., concurring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038 
(1978), or the testimony of an unconfronted witness, Zeigler v. Callahan, 659 F.2d 254, 271 (1st 
Cir. 1981), to the introduction of prior uncounselled convictions, Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506 
(5th Cir. 1977), to the use of hearsay testimony, Fowler v. Parratt, 682 F.2d 746, 751 (8th Cir. 
1982), to a prosecutor's comment on the defendant's failure to testify, Runnels v. Hess, 6S3 F.2d 
1359 (10th Cir. 1981); Satterfield v. Zahradnick, 572 F.2d 443, 446 (4th Cir. 1978), or on the 
defendant's post-arrest silence, Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 461 U.S. 910 (1983); Lewis v. Cardwell, 609 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1979), to jury instructions, 
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086, 1109 (5th Cir. 1982); Dietz v. 
Solem, 640 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1981), failure to move for a continuance in the event ofa missing 
witness that the defendant claimed was deliberately concealed by the government, Ramirez v. 
Estelle, 678 F.2d 604 (5th Cir. 1982), failure to comply with state offer of proof rules, United 
States ex rel. Veal v. DeRobertis, 693 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1982), and failure to raise an issue in a 
state post-conviction proceeding, United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 
1982); Matias v. Oshiro, 683 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1982). 
While some courts have been cautious in discerning the possible boundaries of the Sykes test, 
others have been more precipitous. Compare United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 
at 441-42 (Sykes test held to apply only after comparing the procedural default at issue with that 
presented in Sykes), with United States ex rel Veal v. DeRobertis, 693 F.2d at 650 ("Any proce-
dural default is covered by the 'cause and prejudice' standard .... ") (emphasis added). See 
also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 129 ("While the nature of a constitutional claim may affect the 
calculation of cause and actual prejudice, it does not alter the need to make that threshold show-
ing."). 
The standard which reigned before Sykes was much more permissive than the cause-and-
prejudice test. It allowed the habeas court to hear the claim unless the procedural default re-
sulted from a deliberate bypass of state procedures. See notes 18-21 infra and accompanying 
text. This deliberate-bypass standard may still apply to decisions of the sort entrusted to the 
defendant himself, such as how to plead, whether to forgo the assistance of counsel or to waive a 
jury, and whether to take an appeal. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 91-94 (Burger, C.J., 
concurring); Frazier v. Czarnetsky, 439 F. Supp. 735, 737- 38 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Goodman & 
Sallett, Wainwright v. Sykes: The Lower Federal Courts Respond, 30 HAsrINGS L.J. 1683, 1689-
90 (1979); Hill, The Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 
1050, 1067 (1978). 
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mine whether a state ruling is based upon an adequate state procedural 
ground, requiring application of the cause-and-prejudice test before 
habeas review will be permitted. Part I analyzes the rationale for the 
rule of Wainwright v. Sykes as well as its historical underpinnings. 
Part II examines the treatment of state court decisions that are based 
both on a defaulted claim and, in the alternative, on the merits of that 
claim. This Part concludes that decisions containing such alternative 
holdings should be governed by Sykes, because the concerns implicit in 
the Sykes standard apply with equal force when state courts have ad-
dressed the merits of a claim as well as procedural issues. Part III 
examines the proper treatment of state court decisions that affirm a 
petitioner's conviction without opinion. This Note argues for a pre-
sumption in favor of habeas review in such "silent affirmance" cases. 
Part IV explores the standard by which to determine if a given state 
ruling, even when unambiguously procedural, constitutes a state 
ground for decision that is "adequate" to preclude habeas review. 
This Part concludes that a state procedural ruling is adequate to bar 
habeas review if the forfeiture called for is reasonably calculated to 
promote a legitimate interest of the state. 
I. UNDERPINNINGS OF THE CAUSE-AND-PREJUDICE TEST 
The statutory form of the writ of habeas corpus for state prisoners 
affords relief from "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States."10 Courts today use habeas corpus ex-
pansively as a means of independent review of decisions based on fed-
eral constitutional law. 11 In its present expansive form, the proper 
scope of federal habeas corpus relief has become "[t]he most contro-
versial and friction-producing issue in the relation between the federal 
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982). More broadly, habeas corpus in the United States today is 
said to "provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable 
restraints" upon liberty. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963). 
11. Although historical views of the writ differ, compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-427 
(1963) (vindication of due process historically the role of habeas corpus), with Fay, 372 U.S. at 
449-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (scope of habeas corpus very limited throughout most of its his-
tory), it seems clear that habeas corpus did not always serve its present expansive function as an 
independent review of errors of federal constitutional law. At one time, federal collateral review 
was restricted to the narrow question of whether the sentencing tribunal had jurisdiction of the 
case. See, e.g., Ex parte Harding, 120 U.S. 782, 783-84 (1887); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 
420-21 (1885). That, at least, is the question courts purported to be addressing. The meaning of 
the term "jurisdiction" in this context may have been rather strained. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 450-
51 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
The Court in recent years appears to have abandoned the historical approach to resolving 
habeas corpus issues which it employed in Fay. This is probably for the best, since few of the 
historical issues surrounding the writ have been resolved. Moreover, as Professor Charles Allan 
Wright observed, "[w]hat happened when the Normans conquered England, though very inter-
esting in its own right, does not seem to be of much help in achieving" consensus on the proper 
function of the writ in a federal system in the late twentieth century. Wright, supra note 2, at 
810. For a recent comprehensive study of the historical development of habeas corpus, see W, 
DUKER, A CoNSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS (1980). 
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courts and the states."12 This controversy has been reflected in shift-
ing alignments and in particularly acrimonious divisions within the 
Supreme Court over the last three decades. 13 
In Brown v. Allen, 14 the Supreme Court definitively expanded the 
scope of habeas corpus to include reconsideration of ordinary constitu-
tional error. The habeas petitioner in Brown alleged discrimination in 
the selection of grand jurors and the unconstitutional admission of cer-
tain evidence. Although the state appellate courts had heard these 
same claims, and although the petitioner did not claim that the appel-
late process had been inadequate to determine the issues, the Court 
held that the petitioner was entitled to have them redetermined by 
writ of habeas corpus.15 
But in the companion case of Daniels v. Allen, 16 the Court limited 
the effect of its decision in Brown by denying collateral review of a 
procedurally defaulted claim. The appeal in Daniels was dismissed be-
cause the petitioner, purely from inadvertence, filed his appeal in state 
court one day late. The Court held that this default barred habeas 
review, stating that a contrary holding would allow habeas corpus to 
be used "in lieu of an appeal," and "would subvert the entire system of 
state criminal justice." 17 
Ten years later, in 1963, the Court reversed itself. In Fay v. Noia 18 
the Court allowed federal habeas review despite the petitioner's state 
procedural default, holding that the habeas court had discretion to 
12. Wright, supra note 2, at 802 (quoting 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4261, at 588 (1978)). As long as the writ was confined to 
claims by state prisoners that the state court was without jurisdiction of the case, there was little 
occasion for conflict between legitimate state interests in the integrity of their procedures and 
substantive federal constitutional law. Presumably, when the state court was without jurisdiction, 
it could claim no legitimate interest in compliance with its procedures by the petitioner. See Fay 
v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 454 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
13. See, e.g., the unusually acerbic see-saw exchanges between Justices O'Connor (writing for 
the Court) and Brennan (dissenting) in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 123-24 n.25, 137, 144, 148 
(1982); see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 78 (1977) (noting the "sharp division" in the 
Court over the years on habeas issues). 
14. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
15. 344 U.S. at 459. The Court declared that these prior state determinations of federal 
issues could be reconsidered subject to "the weight that federal practice gives to the conclusion of 
a court of last resort of another jurisdiction on federal constitutional issues." 344 U.S. at 458. 
See also Brown, 344 U.S. at 499-500 (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion) (such reconsideration is 
authorized by the clear meaning of the federal law). 
16. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
17. 344 U.S. at 484-85. Although the rather harsh application of the procedural bar in Dan-
iels suggested an absolute rule that claims defaulted in state court would be foreclosed on habeas 
review, the Daniels Court did observe that "some interference or incapacity" might excuse non-
compliance with a state procedural rule. 344 U.S. at 487. The Court also noted that the North 
Carolina procedural rule at issue did not, of itself, violate the Constitution, 344 U.S. at 486, 
thereby suggesting that particular state rules or rulings might be held unconstitutional and there-
fore inadequate to bar habeas review. 
18. 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
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deny review only where the petitioner had deliberately bypassed19 or 
had exercised "an intelligent and understanding waiver"20 of state pro-
cedures for hearing the claim.21 
The Supreme Court largely repudiated Fay 22 fourteen years 
19. 372 U.S. at 438. 
20. 372 U.S. at 399. 
21. 372 U.S. at 438. The petitioner in Fay, like the petitioner in Daniels, had filed his state 
appeal a day late. In contrast to the Daniels Court's summary treatment of the default issue, 
however, Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Fay, undertook a lengthy historical analysis of 
the problem. In extending the coverage of the writ to state prisoners in 1867, Judiciary Act of 
Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 386, Justice Brennan argued, Congress intended also to enhance 
the efficacy of the remedy. Indeed, "a remedy almost in the nature of removal . • • seems to have 
been envisaged." 372 U.S. at 415 (emphasis in original). Since the federal courts had been given 
such broad power by Congress, in Justice Brennan's view, the bar which the Court had raised to 
review of defaulted claims in Daniels was purely prudential. Because the state's interest in "an 
airtight system of forfeitures," 372 U.S. at 432, was felt to be of a lesser order than that of 
alleviating substantively unconstitutional restraints, Justice Brennan and the majority held that 
the state interest should yield. See 372 U.S. at 426-27, 431-32. 
The Fay deliberate-bypass standard was even more permissive than it appeared on its face. A 
close examination of the facts of Fay reveals that the default which occurred there was not acci-
dental, but the result of a "grisly choice." Noia had been tried for a capital offense and had 
received, not the death penalty, but a sentence of life imprisonment. Noia initially chose to "sit 
content" with this sentence rather than appeal and risk electrocution upon retrial, but he belat-
edly changed his mind. See 372 U.S. at 439-40. There was also evidence in the record that Noia 
simply did not wish to incur the expense of an appeal. Michael, The "New" Federalism and the 
Burger Court's Deference to the States in Federal Habeas Proceedings, 64 I0WA L. REV. 233, 245 
n.90 (1979). 
22. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (rejecting "the sweeping language of Fay v. 
Noia [as] going far beyond the facts of the case eliciting it"). 
Fay has been "virtually supplanted" by the holding in Sykes. Wright, supra note 2, at 809. 
But see note 9 supra. The case continues to be relevant, however, for its salutary focusing of the 
issue. The habeas statute explicitly requires, as a jurisdictional prerequisite, that the petitioner 
have "exhausted" his state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1982); see note 1 supra. Before 
Fay, the Court typically approached the problem of state procedural defaults as an aspect of this 
statutory requirement. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 425. In Fay, the Court jettisoned this approach. See 
372 U.S. at 435; 372 U.S. at 462 n.19 (Harlan, J., dissenting); note 21 supra. This has allowed 
subsequent debate on these issues to focus explicitly upon prudential and policy, rather than 
upon jurisdictional, concerns. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 96 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring); 433 U.S. at 
100-01 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Were the problem of state procedural defaults still per-
ceived as one of "exhaustion," the debate would necessarily center around the intent of Congress 
in enacting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c) (1982) (requiring exhaustion of state remedies as jurisdic-
tional prerequisite). Because the issue of state procedural defaults and their effect on habeas 
review simply did not arise as the writ was understood in 1867, see notes 11-12 supra, such 
"congressional intent" could not have existed. See Hill, supra note 9, at 1058. 
It continues to be important, therefore, to distinguish between cases dealing with exhaustion 
issues and those dealing with defaults. This Note discusses problems of default only. The two 
types of cases superficially resemble one another, but the exhaustion requirement refers only to 
state remedies still open to the applicant at the time he files for federal habeas relief. Fay, 372 
U.S. at 435. In an exhaustion case, just as in a default case, the habeas court will inquire whether 
the state court affirmance was "on the merits" or on "procedural" grounds. The purpose of the 
exhaustion inquiry, however, is to determine whether the petitioner may simply amend his state 
petition and continue to seek his remedy there. 
Thus, in the exhaustion context, a state disposition on "procedural" grounds refers only to 
the most formalistic aspects of procedure, such as whether the petitioner named the correct party 
as respondent in his state post-conviction proceeding. A state disposition "on the merits," in an 
exhaustion case, means any denial of relief that is meant to be permanent, including a holding 
that the claim has been lost under state procedural rules. In the former case, the petitioner may 
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later,23 this time with Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court and Jus-
tice Brennan, who authored the Fay opinion, dissenting. In Wain-
wright v. Sykes, 24 the Court barred habeas review of a claim based 
upon a defaulted objection to the admission of a confession. It said 
that a failure to comply with a state procedural rule could be excused 
on habeas review only if the petitioner could show both "cause" for 
failing to obey the rule and "prejudice" arising from the inability to 
raise the claim.25 
The Court rejected the Fay deliberate-bypass standard in favor of 
the stricter cause-and-prejudice test primarily to preserve "the many 
interests which [a contemporaneous-objection rule] ... serves in its 
own right."26 First, such rules facilitate the development of the record 
on a constitutional claim at trial "when the recollections of the wit-
nesses are freshest .... "27 Second, a rule precluding review where 
error has not been preserved by objection ensures that the judge who 
observed the demeanor of witnesses will make the factual determina-
tions essential to proper consideration of the merits of the claim. 28 Fi-
nally, a system of forfeitures serves the interest in finality of judgments 
simply amend his petition for state post-conviction relief, and continue to seek his remedy there. 
In the latter, the default is fatal to his claim in state courts. 
In an exhaustion case, unlike in a default case, the federal court may choose to abate the 
habeas action to permit the state court to clarify its prior ruling where the reason for that ruling 
(procedural or otherwise) was unclear. See, e.g., Piercy v. Parratt, 579 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1978). 
23. Actually, there were strong indications even before Sykes that Fay was on the wane. In 
Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41 (1972), the Court held that petitioner's attorney's failure to 
include all grounds for challenge to the conviction in his motion for new trial despite a warning 
from the state trial court judge, a default attributable solely to the attorney's mistake as to the 
requirements of state procedural law, constituted a "deliberate bypass" of those procedures 
under Fay. The Court in Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), declined to apply Fay to 
determine whether a federal prisoner had waived his right to habeas review under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 (1982) (federal "habeas corpus"). Instead, the Court applied the standard of FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 12, which bars claims not raised before trial based on defects in the institution of 
criminal proceedings, absent "cause shown" for not asserting those claims. Finally, in Francis v. 
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), the Court applied a two-part cause-and-prejudice standard to a 
defaulted constitutional claim by a state prisoner regarding the composition of a grand jury. The 
cause-and-prejudice test has been associated with Sykes, more so than with Francis, perhaps 
because in Francis the state procedural rule happened to be identical to the federal rule and 
Francis, like Davis, was thought to be based on an analogy to FED. R. CRIM. P. 12. See, e.g., 
O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1223 (5th Cir. 1977) (Goldberg, J., dissenting) ("I view 
Francis as sui generis, resting on particular problems raised by objections to the process of initiat-
ing prosecutions."), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977). 
24. 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
25. 433 U.S. at 87. 
26. 433 U.S. at 88. Subsequent decisions have extended the cause-and-prejudice test to a 
broad range of procedural defaults. See note 9 supra. 
27. 433 U.S. at 88. 
28. 433 U.S. at 88. In support of this consideration, it should be noted that the 1966 amend-
ments to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provide for greater habeas court deference to factual findings by state 
courts. See S. REP. No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS 3663, 3664-65. Because state procedural rules encourage timely hearing of the factual 
matters surrounding admissibility, protecting such rules in the federal courts arguably will 
render those initial findings more complete and more worthy of such deference. 
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and jury verdicts by increasing the probability that evidence objected 
to will be excluded at trial, before any finding of guilt has been 
entered.29 
None of these observations on the wisdom of procedural rules re-
quiring timely action is particularly new. What is novel3° is that these 
arguments are advanced in support of enforcing state procedural rules 
infederal courts.31 In its readiness to treat the state courts as exercis-
ing "a coordinate jurisdiction within the federal system,"32 the Court 
has signalled its concern that state systems of procedural forfeitures 
operate effectively, without being subverted on collateral review by a 
foreign (i.e., the federal) jurisdiction. 
The Sykes Court denounced the Fay standard as subverting the 
enforcement of state procedural rules. The Fay rule was said to en-
courage "sandbagging" on the part of defense lawyers, who might in-
tentionally forgo a valid objection, betting on a verdict of not guilty. If 
the jury instead returned a guilty verdict, sandbagging lawyers could 
count on reversal in a habeas proceeding and a second chance at a jury 
on retrial.33 
29. See 433 U.S. at 88-89. 
30. There are other ways in which Sykes may be viewed as "novel." The decision signalled 
the Court's heightened concern over the social "costs" of habeas corpus, a concern recently 
expanded in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-29 (1982). See also Wright, supra note 2, at 802 
("To many the 'Great Writ' ..• has lost its halo.") (footnote omitted). 
Sykes also represents a movement by the Court away from addressing procedural default 
issues in the language of "waiver" of constitutional rights. "Default," or "forfeiture," involves a 
penalty for failure, even inadvertent failure, to pursue required procedures for implementing a 
right. "Waiver" involves a conscious choice made by the person whose right is at issue. See 
generally Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale far the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in 
Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214 (1977). Fay, in requiring an intelligent and under-
standing waiver of state remedies before habeas review would be barred, 372 U.S. at 399, clearly 
adopted a waiver approach. Critics of this approach argue that the attempt to explain forfeiture 
rules for inadvertent defaults in terms of waiver only clouds the strict and unyieldingly par-
ticipatory understanding of the term "waiver" in more appropriate contexts. CJ Jiminez v. Es-
telle, 557 F.2d 506, 508 (5th Cir. 1977) (that a defendant who failed to claim constitutional 
protections at appropriate junctures at trial could be said to have "waived" those rights is "high 
fiction" under traditional waiver standard); Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More 
Careful Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REv. 193, 205, 209 (1977) ("rationalization" by the courts of 
preclusionary penalties in terms of waiver is "unfortunate"); Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Proce-
dural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 473, 474-76, 513-14 (1978) (rights may 
be lost by waiver or by default; clarity of definition is important for analyzing which standard to 
apply). 
3 I. Because federal courts are to enforce state procedural rules in much the same way as they 
do the federal rules, it is not surprising that the judicial standards for evaluating the effect of a 
procedural default on habeas review are today the same for both state and federal prisoners. See, 
e.g., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (cause-and-prejudice test applied to federal 
prisoner). 
32. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88 (1977). 
33. 433 U.S. at 89. The Sykes Court's argument that, under Fay, defense counsel would 
resort to intentional "sandbagging" maneuvers has been criticized as factually unsound. See, 
e.g., Hill, supra note 9, at 1074-75; Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation 
of Counsel: The Supreme Court Has Work to Do, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1, 43-46 (1978); Note, 
Federal Habeas Corpus Review of Unintentionally Defaulted Constitutional Claims, 130 U. PA. L. 
REv. 981, 994-98 (1982); see also Sykes, 433 U.S. at 104 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[A]ny realis-
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Moreover, the refusal of habeas courts to honor state forfeiture 
rules may discourage state court enforcement of the state's own proce-
dural rules.34 Under Fay, the Court argued, the state reviewing courts 
knew that if they affirmed the defendant's conviction on procedural 
grounds, the federal courts would hear the claim on the merits any-
way. The federal courts would then decide the question without sub-
stantive guidance from the state courts. This situation provided the 
state courts with an incentive to ignore the procedural rule. By decid-
ing the claim on its merits despite the default, state courts hoped to 
influence the decision of the case.35 
In view of these tactical considerations on the part of judges and 
lawyers, the Court concluded that the Fay rule "tend[ ed] to detract 
from the perception of the trial of a criminal case in state court as a 
decisive and portentous event."36 Yet even under Sykes, as the re-
mainder of this Note will illustrate, the ultimate disposition of a peti-
tioner's claim on appeal in the state courts will often be a most 
"portentous event" for determining the availability of federal habeas 
review. 
IL THE ALTERNATIVE HOLDINGS PROBLEM 
The Sykes decision forces habeas courts to draw a crucial distinc-
tion between cases which a state court reviews on the merits and those 
that it refuses to review on procedural grounds. Where the state court 
has decided a case solely on the merits of the constitutional claim, 
habeas review is permitted. But where a case is decided upon proce-
dural grounds, habeas review is precluded unless the petitioner can 
show cause and prejudice.37 Difficulty arises where a state court has 
tic system of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction must be premised on the reality that the ordinary 
procedural default is born of the inadvertence, negligence, inexperience, or incompetence of trial 
counsel."). 
34. 433 U.S. at 89. 
35. Because the state courts excercise "a coordinate jurisdiction within the federal system," 
see note 32 supra and accompanying text, as that phrase is artfully developed in Sykes, the Court 
is prepared to consider and to respect state courts' desires to channel the final outcomes of cases 
that pass before them. The strongest justification for this solicitous attitude toward state courts 
has been advanced by Professor Bator: 
[W]e must try to create conditions to assure optimal performance by the state courts. Since 
it is given that they will continue to play a role, we might even ask how their performance 
can be improved. . . . 
. . . Conscientiousness, dedication, idealism, openness, enthusiasm, willingness to listen 
and to learn - all the mysterious components of the subtle art of judging well - are at least 
to some extent best evoked by a sense of responsibility . . . . I can think of nothing more 
subversive to the judge's inner sense of responsibility than the notion that, to the greatest 
possible extent, all the important shots will be called by someone else . . . . 
Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 
624-25 (1981). 
36. 433 U.S. at 90. 
37. See notes 2 & 7 supra and accompanying text. 
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arguably based its decision on both procedural and substantive 
grounds.38 
The circuits have split over whether habeas review is precluded 
where the state courts have affirmed a conviction on the basis of a 
procedural default and, in the alternative, 39 on the merits. The Sec-
ond, Third, and Seventh Circuits, along with one panel in the Fifth 
Circuit, have held that Sykes bars federal habeas review when the state 
court relied expressly on a procedural rule as an alternative holding. 40 
The First and Ninth Circuits, and another panel of the Fifth Circuit, 
have taken the opposite view, holding that where the state courts have 
not relied exclusively upon a procedural default, the Sykes test does 
not apply.41 The positions of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits are less 
clear. Both Circuits, however, have applied the Sykes test in cases 
38. Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933 
(1981). 
39. One may be tempted at this juncture to make the argument that alternative holdings are 
"impossible" in this context. If one of the holdings is that the claim is barred due to a procedural 
default, the argument proceeds, then the state court is powerless to render a holding on the 
merits. This argument assumes, incorrectly, that the procedural default ruling is jurisdictional in 
nature. The court is not powerless to hear the defaulted claim, it simply refuses to do so. See, 
e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 301 (1983) ("[An] appeal is intitiated by filing a notice of 
appeal. No other step is jurisdictional."). Nor is it convincing to say, as did the court in Dietz v. 
Solem, 640 F.2d 126, 131 n.l (8th Cir. 1981), that any discussion of the merits of a claim not 
raised at trial must be dicta because it would necessarily be based on the purely hypothetical 
assumption that no procedural default was committed. This is at most a makeweight, since one 
cannot so argue if the state court opinion happens to reverse the order of its holdings so as to 
base the procedural default holding on a hypothetical assumption, le., that the claim has merit. 
40. See Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984); 
United States ex rel. Veal v. DeRobertis, 693 F.2d 642 (7th Cir. 1982); United States ex rel. 
Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1982); Ratcliff v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 474, 475-76 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); see also Williams v. Lefevre, 576 F. Supp. 1488, 1492 
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (review barred, citing Phillips, which is described as "the majority position"); 
Hall v. Wainwright, 565 F. Supp. 1222, 1232-33 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (review barred), ajfd. in part, 
revd. in part, 733 F.2d 766 (11th Cir. 1984). 
41. See Jackson v. Amaral, 729 F.2d 41, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1984); Thompson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d 
996 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983); Bradford v. Stone, 594 F.2d 1294, 
1296 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Rogers v. McMullen, 673 F.2d 1185, 1188 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(citing with approval Thompson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d at 998) (Petitioner Daniel Rogers is also 
known as Daniel Rodgers, and the state court cases use this latter spelling of his name. 673 F.2d 
at 1186 n.1.); Lussier v. Gunter, 552 F.2d 385, 388 (1st Cir.) (decided before Sykes but after 
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976), and declining to apply Francis' cause-and-prejudice 
test in alternative holdings context), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854 (1977). Rogers has been cited, 
incorrectly, as an alternative holdings case adhering to the position that review should be al-
lowed. See Phillips v. Smith, 552 F. Supp. 653, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), ajfd., 717 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984). The state court opinions preceding Rogers rested 
solely on the merits of the case; procedural issues played no part. See State v. Rodgers, 347 So. 
2d 610 (Fla. 1977); Rodgers v. State, 338 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), quashed, 347 So. 
2d 610 (Fla. 1977); see also State v. Rodgers, 347 So. 2d at 614 (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (dissent-
ing justice would have grounded affirmance on procedural default). 
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent Fifth Circuit decisions rendered on or 
before September 30, 1981 (the last day preceding the establishment of the Eleventh Circuit, 
formerly the Fifth Circuit Unit B). See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 
1981). Because separate panels of the Fifth Circuit have reached opposite results, compare 
Thompson v. Estelle, 642 F.2d at 998-99 (review possible), with Ratcliff v. Estelle, 597 F.2d at 
475-76 (review barred), neither the position of the Fifth Circuit nor that of the Eleventh can be 
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arguably presenting alternative holdings problems.42 This Note sup-
ports the position of the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits; habeas 
review should be barred in alternative holdings cases.43 
As for the procedural half of an alternative holding, the policies 
cited by the Sykes court in justifying deference to valid state proce-
dural rules are implicated whenever state courts actually rely upon a 
procedural default for their rulings, even if coupled with a ruling on 
the merits. 44 Federal court intervention by way of habeas review of 
cases decided below by alternative holdings prevents state procedural 
defaults from resulting in forfeitures, as state procedural rules nor-
mally would require. Making the enforcement of the state rule less 
"airtight" in this way diminishes the incentives for making a record 
upon a claim when the recollection of witnesses is freshest,45 for al-
lowing the trial judge to make the factual determinations that will 
form the backdrop of the claim as it works its way through the 
stated with certainty. Oddly enough, the Fifth Circuit panel in Thompson made no mention of 
the Circuit's earlier inconsistent holding in Ratcliff. 
42. In Dietz v. Solem, 640 F.2d 126, 128, 132 n.l (8th Cir. 1981), the court avoided the issue 
by dismissing as "casual observation" and "dicta" the state court's comments on the merits of 
the petitioner's claim. In Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 115-16 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981), the court similarly observed that the state court had not made "a 
complete analysis" on the merits of the petitioner's claim. The Sixth Circuit said in Hockenbury 
that it would apply the Sykes test in any case in which the procedural default was a "substantial 
basis" of the state court's denial of the petitioner's claim. 620 F.2d at 115. See also Jackson v. 
Amaral, 729 F.2d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 1984) ("The greater the reliance on federal doctrine, the more 
likely we are to find waiver [by the state court of the procedural rule]."). 
43. A similar view was adopted in Note, Beyond Wainwright v. Sykes: Expanding the Role 
of the Cause-and-Prejudice Test in Federal Habeas Corpus Actions, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1360 (1984). The author concluded that the cause-and-prejudice test should be applied in alter-
native holdings cases if the procedural ground was dispositive of the claim. Id. at 1385. 
Of course, alternative holdings ought to bar federal habeas revie:w only when the state court 
has actually rendered alternative holdings. Casual comments upon the petitioner's procedural 
default do not constitute the adequate and independent state ground for affirmance envisaged by 
Sykes. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031, 1034 n.4 (11th Cir. 1983) (properly 
refusing to apply Sykes test where state court only remarked briefly on procedural default with-
out concluding that default had been committed or that review was precluded), vacated, 715 F.2d 
502 (11th Cir.), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 1158 (1985). 
The court in United States ex rel Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1982), incorrectly 
treated a state court holding solely on the merits as an alternative holding. The state court said 
that "[d]espite the procedural bars to the bringing of this petition, we have nevertheless elected to 
consider this appeal on the merits" (emphasis added). 689 F.2d at 439. The state court seems to 
have chosen not to enforce the procedural rule, and in such a case it is well established that the 
habeas court need not enforce it either. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. 
It is difficult to imagine that anything less than a holding would justify barring hapeas review. 
Thus, the approach announced by the Sixth Circuit, whereby the Sykes test will apply whenever 
the procedural default formed a "substantial basis" of the state court's opinion, see note 42 supra, 
does not appear helpful. By the same token, nothing more than an alternative holding should be 
required to implicate the Sykes test. Cf Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d at 1034 n.4 (because 
the state court's determination on the merits was the "primary basis" of its decision, Sykes does 
not apply). 
44. See United States ex rel Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1982); Phillips v. 
Smith, 552 F. Supp. 653, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd., 717 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 
s. Ct. 1287 (1984). 
45. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. 
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courts, 46 and for excluding improper evidence before it is ever admit-
ted. 47 Thus, substantially all of the reasons that the Sykes Court said 
justified the protection of state procedural rules exist in alternative 
holdings cases. 48 
Alternative holdings cases differ from straightforward procedural 
default cases, however, in that the state court has rendered an addi-
tional holding on the merits. Despite this difference, the Sykes stan-
dard should apply to bar federal habeas review absent a showing of 
cause and prejudice. 
Congress chose to give federal courts the final word on matters of 
federal constitutional law through the power of habeas review of state 
decisions. 49 The power of federal habeas review does not, however, 
extend to decisions resting on adequate and independent nonfederal 
grounds, whether or not other valid federal claims are present.50 In 
the presence of an adequate state law ground for decision, any merito-
rious federal claim that may exist alongside it is rendered moot, for 
nothing can turn on its resolution.51 
Before Sykes, it was unclear whether a state procedural default rul-
ing could constitute an "adequate and independent state ground" bar-
ring habeas review. 52 Indeed, the Fay Court had declared that "the 
46. See note 28 supra and accompanying text. 
47. See note 29 supra and accompanying text. 
48. This is not to say that all of the reasons supporting the Sykes standard apply with equal 
force to the alternative holdings case. The "sandbagging" problem, see note 33 supra and accom-
panying text, is attenuated in the alternative holdings context, since Sykes remains the general 
rule and the instant problem arises only where the state reviewing court has made an alternative 
holding on the merits. Only a very reckless lawyer indeed would intentionally hope to rely upon 
an alternative holding by the reviewing court as the basis for his sandbagging maneuver. 
The Sykes Court's concern that allowing habeas review despite a state procedural default 
ruling renders state courts more lax in their enforcement of procedural rules, see notes 37-38 
supra and accompanying text, is also weakened in the alternative holdings context. Habeas re-
view of alternative holdings cases would only discourage state courts from making disquisitions 
on the merits of the claim when a holding could be rendered strictly on procedural grounds. The 
desirability of this result is discussed at notes 60-66 infra and accompanying text. 
49. Because state courts are under the same duty as federal courts to uphold the federal 
Constitution, Congress could have left the enforcement of federal constitutional rights in crimi-
nal cases exclusively to the states. As was made clear in Brown v. Allen, however, Congress did 
not so choose. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 499-500 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., separate opinion); 
see notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text. 
50. This is commonly referred to as the "adequate state ground doctrine." The doctrine 
holds that where the judgment of the state court rests on two grounds, one involving a federal 
question and the other not, the federal court will not take jurisdiction. See Ward v. Board of 
County Commrs., 253 U.S. 17, 22 (1920); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977). 
51. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 429 (1963). 
52. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 81-82. Because of its origins in direct review, the adequate state 
ground doctrine could be viewed strictly as a function of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdic-
tion (and its traditional refusal to render advisory opinions) and not applicable to habeas review 
by the district courts. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 429. In Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 
Wall.) 590 (1874), a seminal case in the development of the doctrine, the Court held that the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 as amended, Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 385-86, did not 
require the Supreme Court to review an entire case as it came up from the state courts. Even if 
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adequate state ground rule is a function of the limitations of appellate 
review,"53 and not of habeas review. It is significant, therefore, that in 
adopting a cause-and-prejudice test, the Sykes Court did more than to 
discard the Fay deliberate-bypass standard. 54 Sykes in essence rejected 
the Fay Court's limitation upon the scope of the adequate state 
ground doctrine, and clearly held that a procedural default ruling that 
would have constituted an adequate and independent state ground on 
direct review will also presumptively bar habeas review. 55 Thus, 
where the habeas court discerns anywhere in the record a state court 
ruling constituting an adequate state ground, it need not read any 
further.56 
In alternative holdings cases, the state court has made a procedural 
default ruling and a ruling on the merits. Under Sykes, a state proce-
dural default ruling presumptively bars habeas review. Whether or 
not the Sykes Court can be described as "applying" the "adequate 
state ground rule" on habeas review57 is a semantic question. The im-
portant point is that consideration of the 4olding on the merits would 
the state court decided the federal question incorrectly in the Court's view, "to prevent a useiess 
and profitless reversal" the Court would look into the remainder of the record to see "whether 
there exist other matters ... which are sufficient to maintain the judgment of that court, 
notwithstanding the error in deciding the Federal question." Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 
635. In other words, the Supreme Court, on appellate review, would not decide federal issues 
when substantive state law was sufficient to sustain the judgment. Given the limited nature of the 
holding, application of a similar limitation to habeas review by a district court plainly constitutes 
an extension of Murdock's conception of the adequate state ground. 
A still more basic difficulty in applying the adequate state ground rule to procedural default 
rulings lay in the intuitive difference between procedural and substantive holdings. When a deci-
sion on the basis of substantive state law is dispositive of the case (as in Murdock), the federal 
question is moot; nothing turns on its resolution. Fay, 372 U.S. at 429. But when the decision of 
a state court purporting to be an adequate state ground is a ruling that the federal claim has itself 
been forfeited, the very implementation of the federal right in state court is at issue. See Runnels 
v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1365-66 (10th Cir. 1981) (Logan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). However adequate the state procedural ruling might be to further the state's legitimate 
interest in the integrity of its procedures, the independence (or power of such a ruling to render a 
federal claim moot) was doubtful. But see Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate 
State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 SUP. Cr. REv. 187, 197-98 ("[The] distinc-
tion between state substantive and procedural grounds has a surface plausibility that . . . fails to 
withstand analysis."). 
53. 372 U.S. at 429 (emphasis in original). 
54. For a brief description of the deliberate-bypass standard, see text accompanying notes 18-
21 supra. 
55. See Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87 (petitioner's failure to timely object to admission of evidence 
"amounted to an independent and adequate state procedural ground which would have pre-
vented direct review here"); McCown v. Callahan, 726 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. 
Ct. 139 (1984). This Note argues that Sykes pays deference, in the form of a cause-and-prejudice 
test, only to those state procedural rules that would constitute adequate state grounds for deci-
sion on direct review. Under the Sykes regime, therefore, a determination of "adequacy" pre-
cedes any determination as to cause or prejudice. See Part IV infra. 
56. Upon finding an adequate state ground, "no further examination is required." Brown v. 
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953). 
57. See Hill, supra note 9, at 1051 & n.4. 
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therefore be "useless and profitless,"58 because Sykes holds that the 
procedural ruling will stand alone to justify the state's custody of the 
petitioner. Habeas review, therefore, ought to be barred even where 
the state courts addressed an alternative holding to the merits.59 
The rule here advanced has the virtue of not interfering with the 
forms of state court decisionmaking. 60 When habeas review is permit-
ted in alternative holdings cases, state courts have a powerful incentive 
simply not to comment upon the merits of a claim - an unfortunate 
result. Disquisitions on the merits of constitutional claims should be 
encouraged, because such consideration may be more satisfying to the 
petitioner. 61 More importantly, state appellate courts may often 
render alternative holdings in order to provide an alternate basis for 
affirmance in the event the procedural ruling is reversed. 62 By dis-
couraging state reviewing courts from rendering alternative rulings, 
the state's judicial resources may well be taxed to a greater extent than 
they normally would be, because reviewing courts would have to re-
mand cases upon reversal for separate consideration of each possible 
ground for affirmance. 63 
58. See note 52 supra. 
59. The additional arguments that have been advanced for the opposite rule are singularly 
unpersuasive. One cannot logically argue, as did the petitioner in Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 
48-49 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984), that "when a state court invites federal 
intervention by ruling on the merits . . . , it manifests a judgment that the state's interest in 
resolving the constitutional question outweighs its interest in finality, accuracy and trial integ• 
rity" (emphasis in original). This argument only begs the question, that is whether or not state 
rulings on the merits invite federal habeas review. 
It might also be argued that the very language of Sykes suggests that review should be al-
lowed in the alternative holdings situation. The Court did say that in Sykes it was dealing "only 
with contentions of federal law which were not resolved on the merits in the state proceeding due 
to respondent's failure to raise them there as required by state procedure." Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87 
(emphasis added); see also United States ex rel. Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 440-41 (3d Cir. 
1982). To argue from this statement to a rule in the alternative holdings situation, however, is to 
take the Court's words out of context. All that the Court meant here is that when the state court 
has chosen to ignore a procedural default and has gone on to decide the case solely on its merits, 
the habeas court need not respect the state procedural rule to any greater extent than the state 
court itself did. See notes 7 & 43 supra and accompanying text. 
60. See United States ex rel Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1982); Hall v. 
Wainwright, 565 F. Supp. 1222, 1233 (M.D. Fla. 1983), affd. in part, revd. in part, 733 F.2d 766 
(1 Ith Cir. 1984). 
61. See United States ex rel Caruso v. Zelinsky, 689 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Typi-
cally, decisions on procedural grounds are not as satisfying as decisions on the merits, and it is 
understandable that a court would want to show that it does not think its reliance on a proce-
dural rule is causing any great injustice."); Wright, supra note 2, at 809 ("A rebuff to the prisoner 
on procedural grounds leaves a cloud, however frivolous, over the state conviction •••• "). 
62. See, e.g., Ratcliff v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 
(1979). 
63. See Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 1983) ("Rather than encouraging adjudi-
cation of all issues in as few proceedings as possible, [petitioner's] position would prolong and 
fragment the full and final disposition of state criminal cases."), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 
(1984). 
State appellate courts may render alternative holdings on the merits not only to provide alter-
nate bases for affirmance in higher state courts, but also to gain input into the consideration of 
the merits in case "cause" and "prejudice" are found to excuse the default infedera/ court. The 
April 1985] Note - Procedural Bars to Habeas Corpus Review 1407 
Moreover, in some states the reviewing court must make a cursory 
review of the merits so that it may determine whether a "plain error" 
exception to the state's procedural rule is to be called into play.64 
State courts operating under such a requirement, if their cursory ex-
aminations were taken to be alternative holdings, 65 would find that 
their procedural rulings were almost constantly bypassed on federal 
collateral review.66 
Ill. THE SILENT AFFIRMANCE PROBLEM 
In many cases a habeas court is confronted with a state appellate 
court's summary affirmance, without opinion, of the petitioner's con-
viction. In such a case, it is unclear how the habeas court ought to 
determine under Sykes whether the state court rejected the petitioner's 
claim on its merits or barred it for noncompliance with a state proce-
dural rule. 67 One approach to the problem is for the district court, 
presumably familiar with state practice, to make its own inquiry into 
what the state court was "thinking" when it rejected the petitioner's 
claim without a word. 68 Another common approach simply presumes 
Sykes Court recognized this desire of state courts to channel the outcomes of cases that pass 
before them, even on habeas review. See note 35 supra and accompanying text. It would seem, 
therefore, that yet another consideration manifested in Sykes - the acknowledged role of state 
courts in channeling even the legal issues of a case - militates for the application of the Sykes 
test in alternative holdings situations. 
64. See Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 116 (6th Cir: 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933 
(1981). 
65. Federal courts are often confused, and with good reason, as to what comments by a state 
court actually constitute an alternative holding. See, e.g., note 42 supra and note 67 infra. 
66. The First Circuit's decision in Jackson v. Amaral, 729 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1984), illustrates 
that this danger is not merely an imagined one. There the court allowed federal habeas review 
where the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's only discussion of the merits of the peti-
tioner's claim arose in the context of applying the state's "miscarriage of justice" (a form of plain 
error) exception to its procedural rules. See Jackson, 729 F.2d at 44. 
67. Only in the latter case will habeas review be barred absent a showing of "cause" for 
failing to comply with the procedural rule and "prejudice" resulting from a forfeiture. See notes 
3-7 supra and accompanying text. 
68. This approach was suggested in dicta as long ago as 1953. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 
443,458 (1953). A clear example of its application is Tweety v. Mitchell, 682 F.2d 461 (4th Cir. 
1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1013 (1983), in which the court stated: "[W]e are left to speculate 
whether the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the case on state procedural grounds which 
would preclude federal habeas corpus review . . . or whether the court dismissed the opinion 
[sic] upon consideration of the merits, in which case a review of the merits by this court will be 
appropriate." 682 F.2d at 464 (footnote omitted). This approach was said to require an "inquiry 
into what the Virginia Supreme Court was thinking." 682 F.2d at 464. For a somewhat more 
sophisticated description of the same approach, see Preston v. Maggio, 705 F.2d 113, 116 (5th 
Cir. 1983): "In this circuit, the determination of whether state procedural bars were invoked by 
the state courts has been made on a case-by-case basis, upon a consideration of all the relevant 
indicia." One of the "indicia" said to point to a procedural default ruling below in Maggio was 
the very fact that relief was denied there, since petitioner's federal claim was so strong on the 
merits that it would presumably have "won" had it been considered. 705 F.2d at 117. Thus, 
under the Fifth Circuit's rulings, the greater the magnitude of the possible error in state court, 
the more likely it is that the federal court will presume a procedural default and decline to review 
the matter. 
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that silence by a state court evinces an intent to rely upon an adequate 
state procedural ground. 69 
A third approach to the problem of affirmance without opinion 
involves a two-step analysis. This approach has been endorsed, at 
least in part, by the Supreme Court in County Court v. Allen.10 The 
Court was confronted on habeas review with an opinion of the New 
York Court of Appeals that, though lengthy, was ambiguous as to the 
particular claim at issue. It was, in fact, unclear whether the state 
court had affirmed the petitioner's conviction on procedural or on sub-
stantive grounds.71 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, attacked 
this threshold question by assuming for the sake of argument that the 
state court had been silent on the merits of the issue. 72 The opinion in 
County Court, therefore, offers a pattern for habeas review of a simple 
affirmance without opinion. 
Faced with its hypothetical affirmance without opinion, the Court 
in County Court first inquired if it could rule out entirely the possibil-
ity that the state court based its denial of relief upon a procedural 
default. After examining the record and the state procedural law, the 
Court concluded that the petitioner could not have committed a pro-
69. See, e.g., Phillips v. Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 51 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 
(1984); Martinez v. Harris, 675 F.2d 51, 54-55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982); Lewis 
v. Cardwell, 609 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Hearn v. Mintzes, 708 F.2d 1072, 1076 
(6th Cir. 1983) (suggesting that it might apply the Martinez approach, but finding it unnecessary 
to do so under the facts of this particular case). This approach is generally invoked when a 
procedural default was briefed and argued before the court that affirmed without opinion. The 
briefs and arguments in state court are said to show that the court was "thinking in procedural 
terms." Brown v. Reid, 493 F. Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). This argument ignores the fact 
that the substantive issues also were argued, and therefore the state court could just as easily 
have been "thinking in substantive terms." For the state court to exercise its discretion to excuse 
the default, the argument continues, is a rare and "extraordinary measure." 493 F. Supp. at 103. 
Apart from the obvious assumption made here about the frequency with which state courts will 
exercise their discretion to excuse defaults, this argument necessarily presumes that some clear 
procedural rule must have formed the basis of the arguments in state court. When the state of 
the law is unclear, however, or when the government's procedural default argument is novel or 
simply unfounded, the state court may have rejected it outright, without exercising any ex• 
traordinary discretion to excuse defaults. 
70. 442 U.S. 140 (1979). 
71. The case involved a complex tangle of closely related state and federal claims. See 442 
U.S. at 146, 148, 153-54; see also People v. Lemmons, 40 N.Y.2d 505, 354 N.E.2d 836, 387 
N.Y.S.2d 97 (1976) (opinion of the New York Court of Appeals upholding petitioner Allen's 
conviction). The petitioner claimed that a New York statutory presumption was unconstitu-
tional as applied. The statute, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.15(3) (McKinney 1967), provided that 
the presence of a firearm in an automobile is presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all 
persons then occupying the vehicle. Petitioner moved for a directed verdict on the (state) ground 
that, despite the statutory presumption, he had not been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
of personally possessing a firearm. He did not, however, object on federal grounds to the giving 
of a jury instruction based on the statute. He raised his federal claim - that a conviction based 
upon this allegedly unreasonable legislative presumption deprived him of due process - only in a 
post-trial motion. 442 U.S. at 144-45. 
72. See 442 U.S. at 148 n.6 (proceeding on the basis of the "alleged silence" of the New York 
court). However, the opinion does acknowledge that in any event the state court probably did 
reach the merits of the federal question. 442 U.S. at 153. 
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cedural default. 73 
This inquiry constitutes the first step of the two-step analysis. If 
the possibility of a procedural ruling can be excluded, 74 then the state 
court must have ruled on the merits and federal habeas review may 
follow. If it is possible that the state holding was procedural, the court 
proceeds to the second step. 
The Court in County Court suggested that if the first inquiry re-
sults in a finding that a state procedural rule does generally bar the 
type of claim which the petitioner raises, a habeas court should pro-
ceed to determine whether the state law of procedure contains any 
exceptions to the forfeiture rule that might have applied in the case. 75 
The Court found two exceptions that might have applied to the facts 
of County Court. 76 The decision thus suggests a presumption in favor 
73. The Court began its first-step inquiry by noting that the state's forfeiture policy was a 
"cautious" one, 442 U.S. at 150 n.8, and that New York had "no clear contemporaneous-objec-
tion policy that applie[d] in this case." 442 U.S. at 150 (footnote omitted). Keeping in mind that 
the petitioner had raised his claim before the judge in a post-trial motion, the Court observed that 
under New York law "protest" can be made at the time of the ruling "or at any subsequent time 
when the court had an opportunity of effectively changing the same." 442 U.S. at 150 n.8 (empha-
sis in original). Such protest can be made "expressly or impliedly," and need not be repeated at 
every stage in the disposition of the matter. 442 U.S. at 150 n.8. All of these factors, when 
combined with the fact that no New York court had ever expressly refused on contemporaneous-
objection grounds to consider a post-trial claim like that of the petitioner, 442 U.S. at 150, ren-
dered it highly unlikely that the petitioner had committed a procedural default under state law at 
all. 
74. For example, if only the merits of the claim were briefed and argued before the state 
court, the conclusion is fairly impelled that its silence indicated that it held adversely to the 
petitioner on the merits of the claim. See Washington v. Harris, 650 F.2d 447, 452 (2d Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 951 (1982); see also County Court, 442 U.S. at 152 ("This omission 
[to argue the procedural default in state court] surely suggests that the ... courts were not 
thinking in procedural terms when they decided the issue."). This will not occur often, since it is 
usually considered wise for the prosecutor to argue in the alternative. See Martinez v. Harris, 
675 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982). Errors of judgment and oversights by 
prosecutors do, however, occur. See, e.g., Washington v. Harris, 650 F.2d at 452. The negative 
inference - that procedural issues were argued means that the holding was likely procedural -
is illogical. See note 69 supra. 
There may also be cases in which the decision to apply a new constitutional holding retroac-
tively will override the possibility of a procedural default. In Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 
U.S. 233 (1977), the issue was the retroactivity of the holding in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 
684 (1975), that the state is constitutionally required to establish all elements of a criminal of-
fense beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court suggested that states could choose to insulate past 
convictions from newer constitutional holdings "by enforcing the normal and valid rule that 
failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error." 432 U.S. at 244 n.8. By 
implication, a state may choose not to insulate past convictions in this way. See, e.g., People v. 
Bailey, 21 N.Y.2d 588, 237 N.E.2d 205, 289 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1968). This is a choice that a habeas 
court can respect by rejecting the possibility of a procedural default. See, e.g., Adkins v. 
Bordenkircher, 517 F. Supp. 390, 396 (S.D. W. Va. 1981). 
Finally, state statutes may distinguish between the appellate court's power to "affirm" a con-
viction on its merits and to "dismiss" an appeal for procedural reasons. See, e.g., MICH. Cr. R. 
7.21 l(c)(2)-(3) (West 1985). The state court's choice of words, even in an otherwise summary 
disposition of a case, may thus suggest the basis for its action. See, e.g., Hearn v. Mintzes, 708 
F.2d 1072, 1075-76 (6th Cir. 1983). 
75. See 442 U.S. at 151. 
76. One exception allowed review of technically defaulted claims affecting "a fundamental 
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of habeas jurisdiction when a state procedural rule, by reason of a rec-
ognized exception, does not clearly constitute an independent state 
ground for decision. The structure of the Court's inquiry implies that 
if an exception to the relevant state procedural rule might have ap-
plied, the rule standing alone will not support the inference that the 
state court denied relief on a procedural ground. 77 Rather than at-
constitutional right"; the other applied where a similar claim seeking similar relief was clearly 
raised. 442 U.S. at 151 n.10. 
11. See County Court, 442 U.S. at 151 (Court examines state procedural law for exceptions 
which "might nonetheless apply"); 442 U.S. at 149 (fact of state court decision on procedural 
grounds constitutes an "inference" which must be "support[ed]"); Lockett v. Am, 728 F.2d 266, 
269 (6th Cir. 1984); Kreck v. Spalding, 721 F.2d 1229, 1234-35 (9th Cir. 1983); Henry v. Wain-
wright, 686 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). 
This understanding of County Court potentially affects a substantial number of silent aflirm-
ance cases. Although New York is one of the more permissive states procedurally, exceptions to 
a strict rule of contemporaneous objection are fairly common under state law. Speaking broadly, 
state courts have the power to review claims that were not raised at trial as a matter of discretion 
in the interest of justice, see, e.g., People v. Jones, 81 A.D.2d 22, 44,440 N.Y.S.2d 248, 255 (App. 
Div. 1981); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 470.15(3)(c) (McKinney 1983); Denzer, Practice Com-
mentary, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.15, at 578-79 (McKinney 1971), under "exceptional 
circumstances," State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 69, 327 A.2d 576, 581 (1973), when those claims 
relate to errors which are basic, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 432 Pa. 557, 563-64, 248 A.2d 
301, 304 (1968), that are serious or seriously prejudicial, e.g., Brown v. Reid, 493 F. Supp. IOI, 
102 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Larkin v. People, 177 Colo. 156, 161,493 P.2d 1, 3 (1972); In re Richard, 
75 Wash. 2d 208, 212-23, 449 P.2d 809, 812 (1969), that are fundamental or affect substantial or 
fundamental rights, e.g., Hugo v. City of Fairbanks, 658 P.2d 155, 157 n.3 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1983); State v. White, 112 Ariz. 354, 354, 541 P.2d 1156, 1156 (1975); State v. Krause, 64 Hawaii 
522, 523 n.2, 644 P.2d 964, 966 n.2 (1982); People v. Jackson, 84 Ill. 2d 350, 359, 418 N.E,2d 
739, 743 (1981); Dow v. State, 275 A.2d 815, 821 (Me. 1971); ILL, REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, 
§ 615(a) (1983), particularly when those substantial rights are intimately bound up with the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial, e.g., People v. Mathes, 101 Ill. App. 3d 205, 212, 427 N.E.2d 1269, 
1274-75 (App. Ct. 1981); People v. Jones, 81 A.D.2d 22, 44, 440 N.Y.S.2d 248, 255 (App. Div. 
1981), or strike at the very heart of a state's power to conduct a trial, e.g., State v. Smith, 240 So. 
2d 807, 810 (Fla. 1970); People v. Jones, 81 A.D.2d at 44, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 255, or when such 
review will serve to prevent manifest injustice. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 23 Mich. App. 553, 
555, 179 N.W.2d 211,212 (Ct. App. 1970); State v. Youngren, 275 Minn. 388, 391, 147 N.W.2d 
370, 373 (1966). 
All of the foregoing express broad, relatively standardless grants of discretion to reviewing 
courts to excuse technical noncompliance with procedural rules. They are known colloquially as 
"plain error exceptions," and standing alone they would appear to apply to the overwhelming 
majority of claims raised on habeas review. The question arises, then, whether this second step 
to the County Court approach would render virtually all silent aflinnances subject to habeas 
review. The problem is more apparent than real. In applying these broad exceptions to the 
forfeiture rules, state courts exhibit definite and often strict patterns as to what does and does not 
constitute "plain error." These patterns mark the boundaries to the procedural law of each state, 
State courts have, for example, tended to be more permissive in capital cases (or what were 
formerly capital cases). See, e.g., Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1002-03 (Fla. 1977); State v. 
Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 422-23, 631 P.2d 187, 204-05 (1981) (Bistline, J., concurring); Jaggers v. 
Overstreet, 412 S.W.2d 238, 240-41 (Ky. 1967); State v. Charles, 3 Or. App. 172, 176-77, 469 
P.2d 792, 793-94 (Ct. App. 1970); State v. Moorer, 241 S.C. 487, 495, 129 S.E.2d 330, 334 
(1963); State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980). Other matters which some courts have 
consistently held subject to review despite the absence .of objection are those which go to the 
jurisdiction of the trial court, see, e.g., O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1217 n.19 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977); Kugzruk v. State, 436 P.2d 962, 963 (Alaska 1968); Dow 
v. State, 275 A.2d 815, 821 (Me. 1971); Cooper v. State, 44 Md. App. 59, 63, 407 A.2d 756, 759 
(Ct. Spec. App. 1979); State v. LePage, 536 S.W.2d 834, 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); People v. 
Dunn, 59 A.D.2d 647, 398 N.Y.S.2d 299 (App. Div. 1977), or merely to venue, e.g., Mitchell v, 
State, 240 Miss. 308, 311, 127 So. 2d 394, 394 (1961); Clark v. State, 230 Miss. 143, 146-47, 92 
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tempting to determine whether the state court actually applied the 
exception,78 the habeas court would presume in favor of habeas 
jurisdiction. 79 
So. 2d 452, 453 (1957), in which the trial court can be said to have exceeded its authority, 
Thomas v. State, 243 Ark. 147, 148, 418 S.W.2d 792, 793 (1967), that attack the sufficiency of 
the accusatory instrument, e.g., People v. Bridges, 67 Ill. App. 2d 236, 240-41, 214 N.E.2d 539, 
542 (App. Ct. 1966); Dow v. State, 275 A.2d 815, 821 (Me. 1971); State v. LePage, 536 S.W.2d 
834, 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Grays v. State, 487 S.W.2d 348, 349 (fex. Crim. App. 1972), that 
relate to a verdict which is palpably erroneous, e.g., DeSacia v. State, 469 P.2d 369, 373 (Alaska 
1970); Lechner v. State, 439 N.E.2d 1203, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Commonwealth v. Borges, 
2 Mass. App. Ct. 869, 870, 316 N.E.2d 627, 628-29 (App. Ct. 1974), particularly where more 
than one sentence has been imposed for a single act, e.g .. People v. Johnson, 47 Ill. App. 3d 60, 
63, 361 N.E.2d 768, 770 (App. Ct. 1977); People v. Kitt, 54 A.D.2d 741, 387 N.Y.S.2d 659 (App. 
Div. 1976), or that go to the legality of the sentence imposed, e.g., State v. Verive, 128 Ariz. 570, 
579, 627 P.2d 721, 730 (Ct. App. 1981); People v. Wilbur, 50 Ill. App. 3d 65, 66, 365 N.E.2d 198, 
199 (App. Ct. 1977); State v. Womack, 273 So. 2d 290-91 (La. 1973). Less commonly, state 
courts have allowed review despite a technical default where the claim is that the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain the conviction, e.g., State v. Linhart, 649 S.W.2d 530, 531 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1983), or that the defendant was mentally incompetent to stand trial, e.g., People v. Armlin, 37 
N.Y.2d 167, 171, 332 N.E.2d 870, 873, 371 N.Y.S.2d 691, 695 (1975). 
Where the trial court failed to instruct the jury with regard to a "critical and disputed jury 
issue in the case," Williams v. State, 400 So. 2d 542, 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied, 
459 U.S. 1149 (1983), where the record discloses actual concern on the part of the trial court 
regarding the claim not raised, People v. Carlton, 81111. App. 3d 738,742,402 N.E.2d 310, 314-
15 (App. Ct. 1980), where a similar claim seeking similar relief was raised, People v. De Bour, 40 
N.Y.2d 210, 214-15, 352 N.E.2d 562, 565-66, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (1976), where the objection 
was not immediate but was closely proximate in time, People v. Brannon, 58 A.D.2d 34, 39, 394 
N.Y.S.2d 974, 978 (App. Div. 1977), where the trial court was given an opportunity to change 
the ruling protested, People v. Evans, 87 Ill. App. 3d 714, 716, 409 N.E.2d 562, 564 (App. Ct. 
1980); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.05(2) (McKinney, 1983), as by a post-trial motion, e.g., 
People v. Devine, 98 III. App. 3d 914, 923, 424 N.E.2d 823, 830 (App. Ct. 1981), cert. denied, 
458 U.S. 1109 (1982), where the matter could not reasonably have been known to the defendant 
at the time of his trial, e.g., People v. Haston, 69 Cal. 2d 233,256 n.28, 444 P.2d 91, 106 n.28, 70 
Cal. Rptr. 419, 434 n.28 (1968); State v. Cowans, 10 Ohio St. 2d 96, 104, 227 N.E.2d 201, 207 
(1967), where the claim raises a question oflaw which the defendant could not have obviated by 
an evidentiary showing at trial, People v. Rodriguez y Paz, 58 N.Y.2d 327, 336-37, 448 N.E.2d 
102, 107,461 N.Y.S.2d 248,253 (1983), where the claim raises matters of urgent public concern, 
Cronin v. Lindberg, 66 Ill. 2d 47, 61, 360 N.E.2d 360, 366 (1976); State v. Koonce, 89 N.J. 
Super. 169, 175-76, 214 A.2d 428, 431 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965), or pertains to the proper 
construction or the constitutionality of a statute under consideration, O'Berry v. Wainwright, 
546 F.2d 1204, 1217 n.19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977); People v. Joyner, 57 Ill. 
App. 3d 948, 952-53, 373 N.E.2d 778, 782 (App. Ct. 1978), or even in view of the seriousness of 
the charge, State v. Kramer, 252 Iowa 916, 919-20, 109 N.W.2d 18, 20 (1961); State v. Nelson, 
105 N.H. 184, 189-90, 196 A.2d 52, 57 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1001 (1964), some state 
courts have elected not to hold the defendant to a technical default. 
An objection often need not conform to technical niceties where its meaning is clear. See, e.g, 
Freeman v. State, 486 P.2d 967, 980-81 (Alaska 1971); People v. Flynn, 8 III. 2d 133, 134, 133 
N.E.2d 259,260 (1956); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 470.05(2) (McKinney 1983). When the trial 
court refuses a tendered jury instruction, the defendant may not have to object in order to pre-
serve the issue for review. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW§ 470.05(2) (McKinney 1983). And 
when the defendant successfully sought a ruling to have certain charges dismissed, he need not 
object specifically to the court's adding another count in their stead. People v. Davis, 82 Misc. 
2d 41, 42, 370 N.Y.S.2d 328, 329 (App. Term 1975). 
78. See note 68 supra and accompanying text. 
79. The court in Henry v. Wainwright, 686 F.2d 311,314 n.4 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), vacated, 
103 S. Ct. 3566 (1983), applied precisely this presumption, citing County Court. Because in 
Henry an established exception to the state's procedural rule in capital cases, see note 77 supra, 
might well have applied, the federal court presumed that it was applied, and that the state court 
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If, however, no exception to an established procedural rule could 
even arguably have applied to the case at hand, 80 the habeas court, 
having assured itself that it is possible that the state court holding was 
procedurally based and that it is not possible that the court excused 
the default, may confidently apply state law to bar review in the ab-
sence of cause or prejudice. This approach is similar to the de novo 
application of state procedural law that habeas courts undertake when 
a petitioner presents his claim for the first time before a habeas 
court, 81 but with due allowances for the fact that a state court has 
rendered a decision in the case. 
The two-step approach outlined here is designed to respect the 
likelihood that a petitioner's claim was in fact rejected on its merits, 
thereby entitling him to have the claim reviewed again by a federal 
court. The first step inquiry pinpoints those cases in which the infer-
ence that the state court decided the claim on the merits is strongest, 
and permits habeas review. Cases that do not pass the second step 
requirements for habeas review are those in which the opposite infer-
ence - that the state court barred the claim by reason of a default -
is strongest. Here the habeas court may, with some degree of assur-
ance, apply state law to bar habeas review. The cases which remain, 
those that may fall under an exception to a state procedural require-
ment, are those that truly are ambiguous. For these cases, a presump-
tion applies that ensures federal courts the final word on the merits of 
federal questions, 82 and that protects the petitioner's right to have fed-
eral review of a state court decision of his claim on the merits. 83 
thereby reached the merits. Were it to hold otherwise, the court noted, "federal habeas review 
would unjustly be denied a prisoner who has no way of proving that the state courts did consider 
the merits of his claim." 686 F.2d at 314 n.4 (emphasis added). Because the petitioner's inability 
to prove the basis of the affirrnance results entirely from the state court's silence, fairness would 
seem to dictate that the state, which seeks enforcement of its rule in the federal court, bear the 
burden of proof in the close cases falling under this second step. 
However, when the state court clearly rejected a claim on procedural grounds, and then 
merely denied reargument or leave to appeal without an opinion, the petitioner should not be 
entitled to any presumption in favor of habeas review. Here one can indeed feel certain that the 
state court has not truly adjudicated any issue, on its merits or otherwise. See Jones v. Hender-
son, 580 F. Supp. 273, 276-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
80. Because the Court in County Court concluded that the petitioner had not committed a 
procedural default, or ifhe had, that it might have been excused, it did not suggest what action it 
might have taken had it concluded otherwise. 
81. When a claim is raised for the first time before a habeas court, the state courts have not 
had an opportunity to review the claim and make a ruling which federal courts would be bound 
under Sykes to respect. In order to discourage petitioners from bypassing the state courts en-
tirely in this way, habeas courts have applied the state law of procedure de novo, just as the state 
courts would have applied it given the opportunity. See, e.g., Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 517 F. 
Supp. 390, 395 (S.D. W. Va. 1981), ajfd., 674 F.2d 279 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 853 
(1982). De novo review is desirable in this context because there is no possibility that a state 
court rendered a holding on the merits of the petitioner's claim. 
82. See note 49 supra and accompanying text. 
83. Cf Edwards v. Jones, 720 F.2d 751, 756-57 (2d Cir. 1983) (Newman, J., concurring) 
(expressing concern that in case where no federal judge can be "even reasonably sure" that stale 
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Moreover, "if neither the state legislature nor the state courts indicate 
that a federal constitutional claim is barred by some state procedural 
rule, a federal court implies no disrespect for the State by entertaining 
the claim."84 
The two-step analysis provides distinct advantages over other ap-
proaches that habeas courts employ. Unlike the blanket presumption 
that the state court's holding was procedural, the technique outlined 
here avoids placing undue weight on the unilateral assertion by the 
government, on state appellate review, that the petitioner committed a 
default. 85 In contrast to the approach in which the habeas court at-
tempts to "speculate" on what the state court was "thinking," rulings 
under the County Court technique do not weigh the federal preroga-
tive of having the final word on the merits of federal questions (and the 
petitioner's right to assert his claim) against what a state court "proba-
bly" did. 86 Nor will the absurd situation be presented where, for ex-
ample, a mere typographical error in one of the briefs filed in the state 
court can lead to confusion over what the state court was "thinking" 
when it decided the case, and therefore over whether the petitioner is 
affirmance rested on procedural default, majority's presumption in favor of procedural default, 
see note 69 supra and accompanying text, will lead to mistaken conclusion that petitioner de-
faulted in state court when, in fact, affirmance below was on the merits), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 
178 (1984). 
84. County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154 (1979) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
In sum, "respect" for state procedural rules does not mean that habeas courts must create proce-
dural holdings where none may in fact exist. See note 7 supra. Indeed, the second step "re-
spects" state procedural law by acknowledging, in the cases to which the step applies, that state 
courts may have exercised discretion to hear the claim. 
85. One court employing the blanket presumption of default described the rule as follows: 
"Where the state does not raise the issue of procedural default and the state court holding is 
ambiguous, no presumption of preclusion inheres." Hall v. Wainwright, 565 F. Supp. 1222, 1234 
n.15 (M.D. Fla. 1983) (emphasis added), affd. in part, revd. in part, 733 F.2d 766 (11th Cir. 
1984). This way of stating that preclusion is to be presumed from the silence of the state court 
clearly illustrates that the petitioner's access to federal habeas review would often be determined 
by the prosecutor's unilateral decision whether or not to argue the alleged procedural default in 
state court. 
Although the Second Circuit recently adopted this presumption of default in silent affirmance 
cases in Martinez v. Harris, 675 F.2d 51, 54-55 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982), its 
decision has on occasion met with resistance. For example, based on "[his] own many years of 
personal experience with New York appellate courts," District Judge Knapp refused to apply the 
Martinez rule to a state prisoner's correctable procedural default in a prose post-conviction peti-
tion. Gulliver v. Dalsheim, 574 F. Supp. 111, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), revd., 139 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 
1984). No such state court, Judge Knapp reasoned, would dismiss without opinion a prose 
petition on the basis of a correctable default without telling the petitioner how to correct it. 574 
F. Supp. at 113. And in a concurring opinion in Edwards v. Jones, 720 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1983), 
Judge Newman suggested limiting the Martinez rule to cases in which the defendant in state 
court failed to observe "a well-known rule of trial practice." 720 F.2d at 755 (Newman, J., 
concurring) (quoting Taylor v. Harris, 640 F.2d 1, 2 n.3 (2d Cir.), cen. denied, 452 U.S. 942 
(1981)). 
86. In striking this balance, the state's interest in enforcing a system of preclusionary penal-
ties is arguably attenuated when the state fails clearly to indicate the reason for its holding. A 
rule that goes unannounced presumably does little to promote the timely adjudication of consti-
tutional claims. 
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entitled to habeas review. 87 
Finally, a presumption in favor of federal jurisdiction is the only 
rule that encourages state courts unequivocally to state the bases for 
their decisions. The federal habeas court would face a far simpler in-
quiry if state courts regularly made explicit, if only summary, findings 
of procedural default. 88 When the state procedural law is unclear, 
either because legislation and court rules fail to make it clear, or be-
cause the state courts in the same or a similar case fail to enunciate an 
applicable rule, the federal courts will adopt a presumption in favor of 
review. And where the state court desires to rest its ruling on an ade-
quate state ground, the mere indication of this fact· by a "plain state-
ment"89 will insure that the intent of that ruling will be carried out. 
87. In Martinez v. Harris, 675 F.2d 51, 55 n.6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 849 (1982), a 
typographical error in the brief which the government filed in state court created some doubt as 
to whether the procedural default argument had been clearly presented, and therefore whether 
that issue was "on the mind" of the state court panel when it affirmed the conviction. The 
Second Circuit nevertheless applied a presumption that the state court holding had been proce-
durally based. 
The utility of County Court for analysis of the problem of an affinnance without opinion has 
apparently been lost on the Second Circuit. In Martinez, 675 F.2d at 54-55, the court chose to 
apply a presumption that silence by a state court evinces an intent to rely upon an adequate state 
procedural ground. This is decidedly not the approach of County Court. Moreover, in Phillips v. 
Smith, 717 F.2d 44, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1287 (1984), the court cited 
County Court in support of the view that habeas review is barred in the alternative holdings 
situation. See Part II supra. Because the Court in County Court searched New York law to find 
whether a procedural default had occurred - despite the existence in the state court opinion of a 
ruling on the merits - the Phillips court reasoned that when there are rulings on both substan-
tive and procedural grounds, the procedural ground will still bar review. This argument ignores 
the fact that throughout most of the first part of the County Court opinion, Justice Stevens as-
sumes, arguendo, that the New York Court of Appeals had been silent as to the merits of the 
claim at issue. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text. 
88. Hayes v. Alabama, 566 F. Supp. 108, 111 (S.D. Ala. 1983). 
89. The phrase "plain statement" derives from Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3476 
(1983). The Court was confronted with an analogous situation on appellate review; it was un-
clear whether the state high court had based its decision on state or federal constitutional law. 
Because an "ad hoc method of dealing with cases that involve possible adequate and independent 
state grounds is antithetical to the doctrinal consistency that is required when sensitive issues of 
federal-state relations are involved," 103 S. Ct. at 4375, the Court applied a jurisdictional pre-
sumption. In the absence of "a 'plain statement' that a decision rests upon adequate and in-
dependent state grounds," the Court will presume in favor of its own jurisdiction. 103 S. Ct. at 
3476. Such a "plain statement" is clearly absent from the affinnance without opinion, and a 
presumption in favor of habeas review is therefore appropriate. The approach which probes the 
"thinking" of the state court in each case is just such an "ad hoc method" of dealing with cases 
involving possible independent state grounds, while the two-step approach which presumes in 
favor of habeas review will encourage plain statements by state courts of the reasons for their 
rulings. 
A more strident approach to the problem of affinnances without opinion would require a 
"plain statement" that a decision rests upon a state procedural ground in order to implicate the 
Sykes test. The requirement of a "plain statement" to trigger Sykes' deference toward state pro-
cedural rulings would then parallel the statutory requirement of a "written finding, written opin-
ion, or other reliable and adequate written indicia" of a fact-finding by a state court before the 
habeas court will be required to defer to that finding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982). See S. REP. 
No. 1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3663, 3664-
65. 
Short of a "plain statement" requirement, which would in essence eliminate the problem of 
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IV. THE ADEQUACY PROBLEM 
Sykes held, in essence, that an unambiguous90 procedural default 
ruling by a state court that would have constituted an adequate and 
independent state ground on direct review will also presumptively bar 
consideration of otherwise cognizable federal issues on habeas re-
view. 91 Under this regime, the state court's decision of a procedural 
question often determines whether the claimant will be able to raise his 
substantive federal issue in any court, state or federal.92 If the state 
court, therefore, were to have the last word on the threshold proce-
dural question, the constitutional guarantee represented by the pre-
cluded claim would have only as much force as the state courts were 
willing to allow it. 93 
A system that allowed state courts to foreclose access to the vindi-
cation of federal constitutional rights by interposing unreviewable 
state grounds for decision would clearly be unacceptable.94 In its un-
wavering assertion that an adequate state procedural rule may prop-
erly bar the consideration of a federal claim,95 the Court has 
acknowledged that some form of federal review of state procedural 
affirmances without opinion, the steps advocated in the text will accomplish much the same 
results in a less intrusive way. The "plain statement" required by Long, moreover, may only 
reflect a pragmatic understanding of the infrequency with which the interpretation of state con-
stitutions differs from the federal. See generally Sandalow, supra note 52, at 201-02 (decisions 
interpreting state constitutions often mirror Supreme Court's interpretation of similar clauses in, 
the federal Constitution). State procedural rules, on the other hand, often conflict· with the 
assertion of federal rights. Cf. Note, supra note 43, at 1385-86 (suggesting a requirement for a 
"plain statement" that the procedural ground in an alternative holdings case is dispositive before 
the Sykes cause-and-prejudice rule will apply). 
90. The present Part of this Note deals with unambiguous default rulings which may none-
theless stand or fall as a bar to habeas review depending upon some federal determination as to 
their adequacy. This distinguishes Part IV from Parts II and III, in which the procedural rulings 
discussed were in some sense ambiguous. The procedural rulings examined in Part II were prob-
lematic because they were accompanied by holdings upon the merits of the claim. In Part III, 
the problem was to discern under which circumstances an affirmance without opinion could be 
considered a reasonably unambiguous procedural default ruling. 
91. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 78-79, 81-82, 86-87 (1977); text at notes 52-55 
supra. 
92. See text at note 8 supra. Thus, tying the federal court's enforcement obligations to the 
preclusionary rulings of state courts creates a "double or nothing" effect; either both courts are 
free to address a claim or neither is. Brilmayer, State Forfeiture Rules and Federal Review of 
State Criminal Convictions, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 741, 746 (1982). 
93. Hill, supra note 9, at 1082. See also Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 319 (1958) 
(states cannot limit the guarantees of the federal Constitution). 
94. Such a system would, de facto, give state courts the final word on matters of federal 
constitutional law. Yet Congress chose to vest this power in the federal courts. See note 49 supra 
and accompanying text; Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 550 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
("[T]he federal courts are the ultimate arbiters of federal constitutional rights .... "); 
Sandalow, supra note 52, at 189 ("If the Court did not ... encroach upon the function of state 
courts to declare state law, vindication of federal rights would be subject to impermissible inter-
ference by a decision upon state grounds •... "). 
95. See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 148 (1979); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 
78-79 (1977); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953): 
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rulings is necessary before they can be accorded the deference mani-
fested by a cause-and-prejudice test. The necessity of federal review is 
particularly acute where, as is usual, 96 the state court is vested with 
discretion97 to forgive a default despite technical noncompliance with 
a procedural rule.98 This discretionary power to hear (or, conversely, 
not to hear) federal claims despite a default creates a special danger 
that those claims may be undervalued or even rejected in a discrimina-
tory fashion. 99 
It is clear, then, that the issue of when state procedural defaults 
can preclude consideration of a federal question in federal court is it-
self a federal question.100 Sykes holds, as a matter of federal law, that 
noncompliance with an adequate state procedural rule will only be ex-
cused by a showing of cause and prejudice. And because Sykes man-
dates such deference only to those rules which, because of the many 
interests they serve in their own right, 101 would have constituted ade-
quate state grounds for decision on direct review, the habeas court 
must also make a preliminary102 determination whether the state pro-
96. See note 119 infra and accompanying text. 
97. Even when the court's exercise of discretion would constitute an act of grace, as when the 
legislature could bar discretion outright, the decision to preclude a federal claim may be "inade-
quate" to bar habeas review. If a state decides to grant discretion, it must be exercised in an 
"adequate" manner. The situation is analogous to the state's provision of channels of appellate 
review. While appellate review by the states is not required under the federal Constitution, Jones 
v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983), "once established, these avenues must be kept free of 
unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts." Rinaldi v. 
Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966). See also Hill, supra note 9, at 1084 n.182 {adequacy of state 
court's exercise of discretion over federal claims is subject to review by the Supreme Court). 
98. Such grants of discretionary power to reviewing courts are commonly referred to as 
"plain error exceptions." These allow a reviewing court to notice errors appearing on the record 
even though they were not properly raised at trial. See note 77 supra. 
99. The danger of discrimination against federal claims cannot be considered a thing of the 
past. In an era in which the vindication of federal rights is often perceived, by federal as well as 
state officers, as setting free "clearly guilty people . . . to continue to plunder the innocent citi-
zenry," Letter from Edward C. Schmults, Deputy Attorney General of the United States, to the 
Editor (Dec. 6, 1982), N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1982, at A34, col. 3 {discussing the exclusionary 
rule), there exist strong pressures, in both state and federal courts, to undervalue those rights. 
The "redundancy" of habeas review of state court holdings is often thought to reduce the likeli-
hood that the rights of any given petitioner will be undervalued. In order to make such a depri-
vation felt, courts in both coordinate, but nonetheless competitive, systems would have to concur 
in such a result. 
100. Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965). See also Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 
U.S. 313, 318 {1958) (sufficiency of pleadings based on this federal law is a federal question); 
Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571, 574 (1948) (same); Brilmayer, supra note 92, at 742 (same). 
101. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. 
102. As its title suggests, this Note takes the position that the adequacy inquiry stands on the 
threshold of (le., is preliminary to) the application of the cause-and-prejudice test. Most courts 
and observers confronting the issue have understood the inquiry in this way. See, e.g., Spencer v. 
Zant, 715 F.2d 1562, 1571 {11th Cir. 1983) ("[B]asic principles of due process and federal 
supremacy dictate that, before deferring to state interpretations of state procedural rules that 
result in forfeiture of a federal claim, the federal court should first determine that the state rule 
and its interpretation are 'independent and adequate.'") (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 
72, 87 {1977)); Breest v. Perrin, 655 F.2d 1, 2 n.l (1st Cir. 1981) {adequacy an issue "that must 
be considered before deciding the effect of Wainwright v. Sykes"); St. John v. Estelle, 563 F.2d 
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cedural ruling advanced would prima facie have been "adequate" to 
bar further review. 
It remains unclear, however, how the federal habeas court is to 
determine adequacy. The few courts and commentators who have 
confronted the issue, both on direct and on habeas review, suggest sev-
eral approaches. One method formerly used by some federal courts to 
determine adequacy applied federal plain error doctrine103 for the ben-
efit of state prisoners. 104 Another approach that found favor for a 
time was a de novo application of state standards.105 This approach 
viewed the adequacy inquiry as a form of original application of state 
standards of discretion. 106 Both of these methods have since been re-
168, 172 (5th Cir. 1977) (fjoftat, J., dissenting); Goodman & Sallett, supra note 9, at 1690. But 
see Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1614 (5th ed. 
1980); Hill, supra note 9, at 1059-88 (treating adequacy under the general rubric of "cause"). 
"Cause" and "adequacy" are indeed separate concepts. The adequate state ground doctrine has 
its origins in the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, both civil and criminal, see note 52 
supra, where it has long existed completely apart from the collateral review concept now known 
as "cause." The idea of"cause" derives from FED. R. CRIM. P. 12, which requires certain claims 
to be raised before trial absent "cause shown." See note 23 supra. In the rule 12 context, 
"cause" has meant, in accord with common usage, some form of excuse for noncompliance with 
the rule. See, e.g., United States v. Grandmont, 680 F.2d 867 (1st Cir. 1982) (claim that govern-
ment failed to furnish trial counsel with copy of affidavit upon which allegedly unlawful search 
was based). In other words, cause exists under rule 12 under those exceptional circumstances in 
which a court refuses to penalize a criminal defendant for the ignorance or inadvertence of his 
attorney. See United States v. Hall, 565 F.2d 917, 920 (5th Cir. 1978); Buono v. United States, 
126 F. Supp. 644, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). Cause under Sykes, therefore, typically involves an 
assertion that trial counsel lacked knowledge or notice of the grounds for objection. See, e.g., 
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 130 (1982) (claim that trial counsel could not have known that jury 
instructions were defective); Graham v. Mabry, 645 F.2d 603, 607 (8th Cir. 1981) (if counsel had 
been unaware of defendant's previous connection with juror, cause might have been shown); see 
also Tyler v. Phelps, 643 F.2d 1095, 1101 (5th Cir. 1981) (in absence of explanation from trial 
counsel for failure to make objection, cause under Sykes will not be found), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 
935 (1982). It is difficult to fathom, then, how an "adequacy" claim, le., a claim that a state 
forfeiture rule unduly burdens federal rights, can be deemed "cause" for failing to comply with 
the rule. 
103. Every federal court considering the claims of a federal prisoner has discretion to notice 
"[p]Jain errors or defects affecting substantial rights ... although they were not brought to the 
attention of the court." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). 
104. The result of such an approach would be to allow habeas review of claims which, 
although forfeited under state standards of discretion, would constitute plain error under the 
federal formulation of that exception. Justice White first suggested applying the federal standard 
in his concurrence in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 99 (1977). For applications of federal 
plain error doctrine on habeas review, see, e.g., Cook v. Bordenkircher, 602 F.2d 117, 119 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 936 (1979); Berrier v. Egeler, 583 F.2d 515, 522 (6th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978); United States ex rel Floyd v. Wardens, Pontiac & Joliet Correc-
tional Centers, 480 F. Supp. 232, 235 (N.D. Ill. 1979). But see Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 
111, 114 (6th Cir. 1980) (denying that Sixth Circuit had ever allowed habeas review based solely 
upon an independent federal analysis of plain error), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 933 (1981). 
105. See, e.g., Brewer v. Overberg, 624 F.2d 51, 53 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
1085 (1981); Krzeminski v. Perini, 614 F.2d 121, 123 n.2 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 866 
(1980); Cook v. Bordenkircher, 602 F.2d 117, 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 936 (1979); 
Berrier v. Egeler, 583 F.2d 515, 522 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978). 
106. State formulations of plain error doctrine are often narrower than that embodied in the 
federal rule. See, e.g., State v. Morrill, 127 Vt. 506, 511, 253 A.2d 142, 145 (1969) (reviewing 
court has discretion to excuse a default only in "one of those rare and extraordinary cases where 
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jected by the Court107 on the ground that the states are entitled to 
apply and interpret their own plain error rules. 108 
The remaining approaches to determining the adequacy of state 
procedural rulings draw, quite plausibly, on adequacy doctrine as it 
has developed in the context of direct review. The adequate state 
ground doctrine has its very origins in problems of direct review, 109 
and courts and commentators historically have drawn analogies be-
tween the treatment of defaulted claims in the habeas and direct re-
view settings. 110 Such analogies are particularly apposite at the 
present time because Sykes restricted habeas review of defaulted 
claims, at least in part, precisely in order to parallel the treatment of 
such claims on direct review. 111 Most significantly, the Sykes Court 
a glaring error occurred during the trial and was so grave and serious that it strikes at the very 
heart of the respondent's constitutional rights"). 
107. The Court, with Justice White in the majority, recently dismissed the federal plain error 
approach as flatly inconsistent with Sykes. In the Court's view, the appropriate context for fed• 
eral plain error inquiry is on direct review offederal convictions by federal courts. See Engle v. 
Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982). The Sykes test was itself established because review of state 
convictions "entail[s] greater finality problems and special comity concerns" which are not pres• 
ent on direct review of federal convictions. 456 U.S. at 134. The burden of justifying habeas 
review is, therefore, greater than that required to show plain error under the federal standard, 
456 U.S. at 134-35. It consists of demonstrating cause and prejudice. 
The Court also rejected the de novo application by federal courts of state standards of discre-
tion, remarking that "we should not rely upon a state plain error rule when the State has refused 
to apply that rule to the very sort of claim at issue." 456 U.S. at 135 n.44. Accord McKinney v. 
Estelle, 657 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 937 (1982); Guichard v. Smith, 517 
F. Supp. 942 (E.D.N.Y.), ajfd., 681 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1981); Young v. Sams, 510 F. Supp. 141 
(E.D.N.C.), dismissed, 679 F.2d 892 (4th Cir. 1981); Serrano v. Duckworth, 525 F. Supp. 9 
(N.D. Ind. 1979). 
108. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 n.44 (1982). 
109. See note 52 supra. 
110. In 1959, Professor Henry Hart suggested that state grounds adequate to prevent the 
Supreme Court from hearing a claim on direct review ought also to bar the claim on habeas 
review. Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 118-19 (1959). 
Four years later, the Fay Court rejected that suggestion, holding instead that the adequate state 
ground doctrine was applicable only on direct review. See note 53 supra and accompanying text. 
Not long after Fay was decided, Professor (now Dean) Sandalow observed that an anomaly had 
arisen in the availability of federal review of defaulted claims. Even when a given procedural 
ruling was adequate to bar review by the Supreme Court in its appellate capacity, review could be 
had collaterally in any of the dozens of federal district courts. Sandalow, supra note 52, at 230-
31. This led Sandalow to read Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), see text at notes 132-36 
infra, as establishing parity between forfeiture standards at some "intermediate position" be-
tween the permissive approach of Fay v. Noia and what he viewed as the unnecessarily strict 
approach embodied in traditional adequate state ground doctrine. See Sandalow, supra note 52, 
at 235-38. For the suggestion that standards of direct and collateral review should be the same 
because review by federal habeas courts today serves as a de facto substitute for direct review by 
an overburdened Supreme Court, see Michael, supra note 21, at 264 n.233, 269. 
111. Professor Hill, supra note 9, makes this observation most trenchantly. He begins with 
the example of a defaulted claim by a federal prisoner. It is clear, in Hill's view, that because 
Congress intended the prisoner's default to be fatal (absent cause shown) on direct review, as 
provided in FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(2), it could not have intended the rule to be circumvented by 
reviving the claim on collateral review. See id. at 1060. The Court said as much in Davis v. 
United States, 411 U.S. 233, 242 (1973). Because no orderly set of rules, state or federal, can 
exist without a system of sanctions, Hill, supra note 9, at 1074, and because there is nothing to 
suggest that 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982), quoted at note 1 supra, contemplates differential treatment 
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has in effect directed habeas courts to determine adequacy by inquiring 
whether the state ground for decision would have been upheld on di-
rect review. 112 
The most radical approach to the adequacy inquiry would hold 
that when the state court has discretion to excuse a default but does 
not exercise that discretion, the state court ruling that the claim is 
barred cannot constitute an adequate state ground to preclude habeas 
review. 113 When a state court decides not to exercise its discretion to 
excuse a default, the proposition begins, it makes an implicit decision 
on the relative substantiality of the claim. Had the claim been consid-
ered substantial enough to rise to the level of "plain error," however 
the state defines that term, the state court would have exercised its 
discretion to hear the claim under the state's plain error exception.114 
Because this assessment of the substantiality of the claim is an implicit 
holding on the merits, 115 the argument continues, it is proper to treat 
for state prisoners and federal prisoners, see Hill, supra note 9, at 1051, 1065, defaults should not 
be forgiven in the collateral proceeding in the face of a federal or state procedural rule that seeks 
to render the default fatal for all purposes. Id. at 1065; see also Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 
536, 541-42 (1976) (comity requires federal habeas courts not to differentiate between federal and 
state criminal convictions). Because Sykes was designed to avoid this "flow-through" between 
direct and collateral review in this way, analysis of the adequacy problem can proceed on the 
basis not only of analogy, but of actual parity between the two review settings. 
112. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977); note 55 supra. It is rather curious that 
under Sykes, federal district courts are directed to conduct an inquiry that had been the exclusive 
province of the Supreme Court. However, the Court's decision to defend the result in Sykes by 
viewing the procedural default problem on habeas review as at least analogous to the adequate 
state ground doctrine on direct review made this circumstance inevitable. 
113. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 233-34 (1969) (direct review); 
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 455-57 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (direct review); Tweety 
v. Mitchell, 682 F.2d 461,466 (4th Cir. 1982) (Mumaghan, J., dissenting) (habeas), cert. denied, 
460 U.S. 1013 (1983); Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107, 1111 n.4 (9th Cir.) (habeas), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 922 (1980); Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 705-06 (4th Cir. 1978) (habeas). 
114. A "plain error exception" is a broad grant of discretionary power to a reviewing court 
to notice errors appearing on the record which were not raised at trial. While the formulation of 
the exception varies among jurisdictions, see notes 103 & 106 supra, its application always in-
volves an assessment of the substantiality of the claim. See the plain error exceptions listed at 
note 77 supra (discretion to notice errors which are "basic," "fundamental," or "affect substan-
tial rights"). 
115. State court determinations that a claim constitutes harmless error have always been 
considered holdings on the merits. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) defines "harmless error" as the 
obverse of plain error - that is, as an error or defect which does not affect substantial rights. Cf. 
note 103 supra ("plain error" defined). Because habeas courts commonly review harmless error 
determinations as holdings on the merits, see, e.g., Edwards v. Jones, 720 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir. 
1983) (Newman, J., concurring), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 178 (1984); Thompson v. Estelle, 642 
F.2d 996 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981); Lussier v. Gunter, 552 F.2d 385, 388 (1st Cir.) ("[T]he [state 
court] decided the substance of [the petitioner's] constitutional claim. It characterized the [al-
leged error] as 'not so prejudicial as to justify reversal.'"), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 854 (1977), they 
ought also to review the plain error determinations implicit in state procedural default rulings. 
Federal review of state harmless error determinations reflects the intuition that what may appear 
insubstantial to a state court may be considered substantial by a federal court. Cf. Kotteakos v. 
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 761 (1946) (appellate review of harmless error determinations neces-
sary because the error may indeed be serious). The same intuition can be said to apply to implicit 
plain error judgments. But see note 124 infra. 
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it as such. Holdings on the merits of a claim are independently re-
viewable by the habeas court, whether or not a default has in fact been 
committed. 116 Habeas review, therefore, is in order. It may be urged 
further that the very existence of discretionary power to forgive the 
default suggests that no vital interest is at stake. "If some deviations 
from regular procedure can be tolerated, a few more can hardly be 
seriously disruptive."t 17 
Appealing as the simplicity and symmetry of this sweeping excep-
tion to the Sykes test may be, it surely could not have been contem-
plated by the Sykes Court. 118 Such an "exception" would swallow the 
Sykes test entirely, since most, if not all, state procedural rules contain 
some provision for discretionary forgiveness of defaults. 119 Under 
such an approach, nothing that a state court could do would insure the 
enforcement of a procedural rule on collateral review. Every decision 
seeking to enforce a procedural rule where discretion was theoretically 
permissible would be subject to unbridled habeas review. 
The reasoning behind this approach, moreover, is not very con-
vincing. The mere existence of discretion to excuse technical defaults 
in compliance with state procedural law does not indicate that no vital 
state interest is at stake. The habeas court must examine state proce-
dural law to determine whether there has been a default; it should not 
matter, for purposes of determining the adequacy of a ruling to bar 
habeas review, whether that law comes from the legislature or through 
the discretion of state courts. Discretion, when it consists of "rea-
soned elaboration" according to known principles, "is nothing more 
than the judicial formulation of law."120 That state courts participate 
in the delineation of their own powers by the primary means available 
to them, namely discretion, cannot gainsay the fact that the lines thus 
drawn constitute the procedural law of the state. Even under the per-
missive Fay standard, state procedural law could not simply be 
ignored. 121 
I 16. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. 
117. Sandalow, supra note 52, at 225. 
118. Cf. Brown v. Reid, 493 F. Supp. 101, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (mere fact that state appel-
late courts may exercise discretion to excuse default does not make Sykes inapplicable). The 
Court might have applied, but implicitly rejected, this approach in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 
125 n.27 (1982). 
119. See Hockenbury v. Sowders, 620 F.2d 111, 114 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 
933 (1981); Hill, supra note 9, at 1086. 
120. Sandalow, supra note 52, at 226. Sandalow distinguishes this sort of exercise-of discre• 
tion from "a power of continuing discretion," which connotes "ad hocness." Id. (citing H. HART 
& A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OP 
LAW 161, 168-79 (tent. ed. 1958)). This Note has argued previously that the discretion repre• 
sented by state plain error exceptions manifests "reasoned elaboration" according to established 
patterns and principles. See note 77 supra. 
121. Under Fay, state forfeiture rules were enforced only when the petitioner had deliber-
ately bypassed state procedures for raising his claim. See notes 18-21 supra and accompanying 
text. 
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Moreover, all that has "implicitly" been determined by a state 
court that declines to hear a claim is that the facts of the claim do not 
warrant forgiveness under the applicable state standard, however that 
standard happens to be formulated. 122 Thus, the fact that a claim is 
held not to rise to the level of a state law standard of discretion is 
simply irrelevant to whether such a ruling is adequate under a federal 
standard.123 Finally, a state court's refusal to hear a claim does not 
mean that it necessarily assessed the substantiality of the claim and 
found it wanting. A state court, under its plain error exception, may 
hear claims which constitute plain error. It is not required to do so. 124 
Courts may also determine adequacy by reviewing a particular de-
nial of a federal claim for consistency with prior state denials. Incon-
sistency with other decisions may indicate discriminatory application 
of a state procedural rule. No one disputes that if a state court were to 
make a ruling which actually discriminated against the assertion of 
federal claims, that ruling would be inadequate to bar those claims. 125 
But the habeas court must surely go beyond inquiring whether the 
state court actually acted with discriminatory intent. Proof that a 
state court acted with "bad" intent is both difficult to come by126 and 
unseemly to search for and proclaim. 127 The adequacy inquiry may, 
122. See notes 106 & 114 supra (formulations of discretionary power to excuse defaults vary 
among jurisdictions). 
123. See Hill, supra note 9, at 1086 n.191. 
124. The seductive argument that a plain error ruling, like a harmless error ruling, is an 
implicit holding on the merits, see note 115 supra, is also of questionable validity. There are 
distinctions between plain and harmless error. When a court decides that a claim does not con-
stitute plain error, it generally poses itself a hypothetical question: if the allegations contained in 
the petition were true, would plain error exist under the applicable state standard? If not, the 
reviewing court will not assert jurisdiction. On the other hand, a court will more often assert 
jurisdiction and conclude that a claim does in fact have merit before it proceeds to find that the 
error is harmless. Only in the latter case has the state court asserted jurisdiction, considered the 
claim on its merits, found it to contain merit, and denied relief. Only in the latter case, therefore, 
is an independent federal determination on the merits clearly in order. See notes 2 & 7 supra and 
accompanying text. Moreover, despite its formal definition, see note 115 supra, harmless error 
involves a pragmatic inquiry as to whether the determination of guilt by the trier of fact would 
have resulted differently had the error not occurred. One would not expect the method of con-
ducting this practical weighing of the effect of error upon the trier of fact to vary among jurisdic-
tions. How the state weighs an error's likely effect on the outcome of a trial would thus seem a 
more reliable and relevant indicator of the importance accorded the right than its correspon-
dence to variable state standards of plain error. 
125. See notes 93-94 supra and accompanying text; Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 383 
(1955); Fox River Paper Co. v. Railroad Commn., 274 U.S. 651, 657 (1927); Sandalow, supra 
note 52, at 196. Indeed, one strongly suspects that in those cases which suggested an "auto-
matic" finding of inadequacy where discretion existed under state law, see note 113 supra and 
accompanying text, the Court in fact believed that the state ground in a civil rights case had been 
administered discriminatorily. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), for 
example, the Virginia state courts had precluded the petitioner's claims that the respondent's 
lease provision was racially discriminatory and constituted a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 
(1982). 
126. See Hill, supra note 9, at 1085; Sandalow, supra note 52, at 219-20. Moreover, the state 
court may undervalue a federal claim inadvertently. See note 99 supra. 
127. See generally Hill, supra note 9, at 1084 n.182 ("[W]hat has characterized Supreme 
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therefore, proceed on the basis of indicia of discriminatory application, 
particularly whether the nonf ederal ground put forth by the state 
courts is inconsistent with earlier state court decisions. 128 
Reviewing a state ruling for consistency and correctness under 
state law might appear to be the proper approach for determining the 
adequacy of a state procedural ruling. The habeas court would act "as 
if it were the highest court of the state, considering the issue of state 
law,"129 and strike down as a bar to habeas review only those rulings 
which were clearly erroneous under state law. However, neither state 
court review nor federal court review after the fashion of a state court 
will substitute for federal review of what remains a federal question. 
The very existence of the power to review state judgments illustrates 
that the highest state court's views will not always be motivated by the 
same considerations as those of the federal court. 130 More signifi-
cantly, consistency with past decisions says little about a ruling's ade-
quacy. State procedural rulings may consistently have been 
"inadequate" to bar federal review. Further, "[a] federal right may be 
avoided by state grounds that lack a foundation in the record as well 
as by those that depart from earlier law."131 Thus, the federal stan-
dard of review of the adequacy of state procedural rulings must scruti-
nize the state ruling more thoroughly than an inquiry that merely 
examines the consistency of that ruling with past state precedent. 
The most appropriate standard for determining adequacy requires 
a demonstration that the forfeiture called for is reasonably calculated 
to promote a legitimate interest of the state. The adequate state 
ground case of Henry v. Mississippi 132 provides important guidance for 
the content of this more thoroughgoing standard for determining ade-
quacy. In Henry, the defendant failed to object upon the introduction 
into evidence of the fruits of an allegedly unlawful search. Instead, 
defendant's counsel included the objection in a motion for directed 
verdict at the close of the state's case. The state supreme court held 
Court practice from the start, so far as concerns examination of the state ground for adequacy, is 
that inquiry into the motivation of the state court is rigorously avoided •.. ,"), 
128. See, e.g., Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 (1964); Wright v. Georgia, 373 
U.S. 284, 291 (1963); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 320 (1958); Fox River Paper Co. v. 
Railroad Commn., 274 U.S. 651, 656 (1927). 
129. Hill, supra note 9, at 1083 (emphasis in original) (describing pre-1965 adequacy doctrine 
in the Supreme Court); see also Note, The Untenable Nonfedera/ Ground in the Supreme Court, 
74 HARV. L. REv. 1375, 1393 (1961) (federalism concerns exist whenever the Supreme Court 
reviews state court decisions). 
130. Professor Sandalow expressed this thought best when he observed that "[t]he Court's 
power to declare the state ground inadequate exploits the institutional differences between it and 
the state courts to assure that in the accommodation of state and federal interests appropriate 
recognition will be given to the latter." Sandalow, supra note 52, at 218. 
131. Sandalow, supra note 52, at 227. See also Ward v. Board of County Commrs., 253 U.S. 
17, 22-23 (1920) (Supreme Court review not precluded if the nonfederal grounds for the decision 
are without fair and substantial support). 
132. 379 U.S. 443 (1965). 
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the claim barred on procedural grounds. On direct review, in dicta, 133 
the Supreme Court suggested that "a litigant's procedural defaults in 
state proceedings do not prevent vindication of his federal rights un-
less the State's insistence on compliance with its procedural rule serves 
a legitimate state interest."134 The Court went on to suggest that the 
delay in presenting the objection until the close of the prosecution's 
case did not frustrate the state's legitimate "interest in avoiding delay 
and waste of time,"135 presumably because the trial judge was still af-
forded ample opportunity to consider the alleged error. If this were 
so, the Court observed, and if upholding the forfeiture "would serve 
no substantial state interest," then the procedural ruling could not be 
treated as adequate to bar the assertion of "important" federal 
rights.136 
Although the continued vitality of Henry v. Mississippi has been 
questioned by commentators of late,137 the dicta for which it has be-
133. The Court remanded the case for a hearing as to whether the defendant had knowingly 
waived his right to raise his claim in a timely manner. This result clearly echoes with the Fay 
deliberate-bypass standard for habeas review, see text at notes 18-21 supra, and its application 
here on direct review renders the actual disposition of this case something of an historical 
curiosity. 
134. 379 U.S. at 447. 
135. 379 U.S. at 448-49. 
136. 379 U.S. at 448-49. 
137. See, e.g., Goodman & Sallett, supra note 9, at 1692 n.40; Hill, supra note 9, at 1051 
("Henry is ... dead, or nearly so." (footnote omitted)); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & 
H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 558-
62 (2d ed. 1973). One suspects that these misgivings arise partly from the intuition, born of 
experience, that an opinion authored two years after Fay v. Noia by Justice Brennan (who also 
wrote for the Court in Fay) cannot long remain viable under the Burger Court. More substan-
tially, these commentators, notably Hill, view the dicta in Henry as an aberration, unsupported 
by precedent prior to Henry and not followed subsequently as authority. See Hill, supra note 9, 
at 1052, 1083-84. 
While the Henry dicta probably went beyond mere synthesis of prior decisions, but see Re-
cent Developments, Federal Jurisdiction: Adequate State Grounds and Supreme Court Review, 65 
COLUM. L. REv. 710, 713 (1965) (Henry is "a fair synthesis of prior decisions" (footnote omit-
ted)), it did have significant antecedents. Under the "inconsistency" approach to adequacy the 
Court held "inadequate" those state grounds that departed from prior state precedent. See note 
128 supra and accompanying text. This approach reflected something more than a concern with 
mere notice to defense counsel of state procedures. There was also the belief that a state rule that 
is not consistently followed and is without adequate precedent likely does not serve a legitimate 
state purpose. See Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149 (1964) ("We have often pointed 
out that state procedural requirements which are not strictly or regularly followed cannot de-
prive us of the right to review."). This is so for two reasons. First, in order for many procedural 
rules to serve any purpose at all, they must be known to the litigants whose behavior the state 
seeks to modify. Second, if a state has consistently tolerated certain behavior in the past, one is 
skeptical that some legitimate state interest has simply "sprung up" in the interim. The "incon-
sistency" approach, then, seeks to reveal more than mere evidence that the state court may be 
discriminating against federal claims. These cases also manifest the Court's disapproval of the 
arbitrariness and purposelessness of the "exaltation of form" to bar the assertion of federal 
claims. See Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313,320 (1958). Professor Hill asserts that, prior to 
Henry: 
a forfeiture for breach of state procedure was sustained by the Supreme Court on direct 
review, however technical and even burdensome the procedure might be, as long as a com-
petent lawyer could have coped with it, and as long as the state court's disposition of the 
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come best known have recently been reaffirmed by the Supreme 
Court. 138 And while the proposed application of the Henry dicta to 
the facts of that case may rightfully be criticized, 139 the essence of the 
Henry approach is thoroughly consistent with the treatment of other 
claimed deprivations of fundamental rights. 140 
The adequacy inquiry should thus be viewed as an inquiry into the 
constitutionality of a claimed deprivation of fundamental federal 
rights by state action. Sykes held that a state procedural ruling may 
constitute an adequate and independent state ground upon which a 
state court may rest its decision. 141 Thus, the procedural ruling paten-
procedural point . . . was fairly predictable in light of the pertinent statutes, rules, and 
precedents . . . . 
Hill, supra note 9, at 1051. This assertion cannot explain the result in Shuttlesworth v. City of 
Birmingham, 376 U.S. 339 (1964) (per curiam). The petitioner had been convicted of interfering 
with a police officer who was taking some "freedom riders" into "protective custody." See Shut• 
tlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 42 Ala. App. 1, 149 So. 2d 921 (Ct. App.), cert. stricken, 274 
Ala. 613, 149 So. 2d 923 (1962), revd. per curiam, 376 U.S. 339 (1964). His petition for review to 
the Alabama Supreme Court was stricken because it was not filed on "transcript paper," as was 
required by court rule. 149 So. 2d at 923. It can be inferred that the Supreme Court, in its per 
curiam reversal of the Alabama Court of Appeals, decided that the transcript paper ruling was 
inadequate to bar review of the petitioner's claim. The Court reversed despite the fact that the 
Alabama ruling requiring transcript paper was supported by ample state precedent, even in cases 
arising under much less politically charged circumstances. See, e.g., Cranmore v. State, 129 So. 
2d 688 (Ala. 1961) (affirming burglary conviction); Ex parte Davis, 269 Ala. 58, 110 So. 2d 306 
(1959) (affirming denial of rehearing of application for suspended sentence); McDonald v. 
Amason, 267 Ala. 654, 104 So. 2d 719 (1958) (action for personal injury to automobile guest). 
One can only conclude from this result that the Court decided, in a manner later suggested by 
the Henry dicta, that the state interest in having court papers be of the same size and thickness 
for filing purposes could not outweigh the defendant's right to assert his federal claim. The state 
ground, therefore, was inadequate to bar review. While Professor Hill is correct in saying that 
adequate notice of state rules for its own sake, and apart from any consideration of burdensome• 
ness, was at times a concern, see, e.g., Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284,291 (1963), this concern 
about notice in particular cases underlies, not the adequacy inquiry, but the separate inquiry now 
known as "cause." See note 102 supra. 
138. In James v. Kentucky, 104 S. Ct. 1830 (1984), the Court on direct review held a proce-
dural default ruling by the Kentucky Supreme Court inadequate to bar review on the merits. 
The state court had ruled that the trial judge was relieved of his obligation (when properly re-
quested by counsel) to instruct the jury not to draw adverse inferences from the defendant's 
failure to testify, see Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981), because of the petitioner's proce-
dural default: he had requested only an "admonition," not an "instruction," to this effect. The 
Court held that the distinction drawn by the state court between instructions and admonitions 
could not prevent review on the merits for two reasons: first, such a distinction had not consist-
ently been drawn under prior state precedent; and second, citing Henry, because "[t]o insist on a 
particular label" for defense counsel's action "would further no perceivable state interest." 104 
S. Ct. at 1835. 
139. The strident tone of the opinion is particularly troublesome when one considers that the 
state rule belabored in Henry was more permissive than the corresponding federal rule. Hill, 
supra note 9, at 1052 n.13. In applying the Henry test, a habeas court should refrain from exer-
cising a degree of scrutiny which would allow lesser scope for the operation of state rules than for 
federal rules. To intrude upon the effective functioning of state rules would undermine the pri-
mary rationale for the Sykes test. See notes 30-32 & 110 supra and accompanying text. The 
Henry Court did observe, however, that it did not contemplate "a plethora of attacks" on reason-
able state procedural rules. 379 U.S. at 448 n.3. 
140. See notes 145-49 infra and accompanying text. 
141. See note 91 supra and accompanying text. 
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tially stands alone to justify the state's custody of the petitioner, even 
where his substantive claim if heard would mandate his release. 142 Be-
cause the writ of habeas corpus for state prisoners affords relief from 
"custody in violation of the Constitution,"143 a state forfeiture ruling 
that is inadequate to bar review of a federal claim and yet that pur-
ports to justify custody of the petitioner is, in essense, a forfeiture in 
violation of the Constitution. 144 
The Supreme Court today tests the constitutionality of governmen-
tal actions which limit the exercise of "fundamental" constitutional 
rights by applying stricter forms of review, or heightened "scrutiny" 
under the due process clause. 145 The Court has also implicitly recog-
nized that the right to fairness in criminal proceedings is one such 
fundamental right. 146 The scrutiny represented by the Henry formula-
tion, 147 which would at a minimum require that state forfeitures be 
justified by a legitimate state interest, can therefore be viewed as thor-
oughly consistent with traditional assessments of the constitutionality 
of state action when that action deprives individuals of federal 
rights. 148 The vindication of the right to fairness in criminal proceed-
ings by means of habeas corpus actions is of " 'fundamental impor-
tance ... in our constitutional scheme' because [habeas petitions] 
142. See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra. 
143. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1982); see Darden v. Wainwright, 699 F.2d 1031, 1036 (11th Cir. 
1983), vacated, 715 F.2d 502 (11th Cir.), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 1158 (1985). 
144. "What is due from the federal courts ... is a fresh look at the degree to which forfeit-
ures are sustainable under the Constitution." Hill, supra note 9, at 1059. 
145. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 457 (2d ed. 1983). 
146. See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1971); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & 
J. YOUNG, supra note 145, at 460. 
147. The Henry formulation of the adequacy inquiry clearly contemplates heightened consti-
tutional scrutiny of state procedural rulings. It is unclear, however, and beyond the scope of this 
Note to determine, what level of scrutiny is intended or may be appropriate. At one point in the 
Henry opinion, it is suggested that a "legitimate" state interest is all that is required to justify a 
deprivation of "important" federal rights. 379 U.S. at 448. In another place, the necessity of a 
"substantial" state interest is mentioned. 379 U.S. at 449. The wide array of rights that can 
conceivably be raised on habeas review vary in their importance, as does the substantiality of the 
state's interest in upholding a broad range of forfeitures. The state's interest in avoiding burden-
some reprosecution may be greater in the context of guilty pleas, for example, than in the case of 
a retrial, because in the former case the state may not have marshalled evidence against a defend-
ant soon after the offense was committed. By the time the plea is withdrawn and the case re-
manded, it may be too late for the state to rebuild its case. See Westen, supra note 30, at 1247-49. 
This suggests that the appropriate level of scrutiny may vary depending upon the combination of 
right and forfeiture presented by a particular habeas claim. 
148. Professor Hill observes that Henry would force federal courts to undertake the task of 
imagining "hypothetical rules that would serve the interests of the state at least as well, or 'sub-
stantially' so." Hill, supra note 9, at 1052. Hill fails to explain how the "task" set by Henry is 
any more burdensome than that undertaken by federal courts faced with other allegedly uncon-
stitutional deprivations of federal rights. Cf Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (striking 
down classification based on illegitimacy in intestate succession statute as not substantially re-
lated to permissible state interests). 
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directly protect our most valued rights." 149 Thus, treating alleged 
deprivations of those rights by applying stricter forms of review is as 
appropriate on habeas review as it is in other contexts. 
It is too soon, in sum, to sound the death knell for Henry v. Missis-
sippi. Discerning whether a state procedural ruling constitutes an ade-
quate state ground for decision has today become an important issue 
that determines the applicability of the Sykes test, and the wisdom of 
the Henry formulation for determining the adequacy of state grounds 
to bar habeas review has now become apparent to a significant number 
of federal courts.150 The revitalization of Henry is a natural result of 
149. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 827 (1977) (quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 
485 (1969)). 
150. The petitioner in Gulliver v. Dalsheim, 574 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), revd., 739 
F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1984), for example, made the mistake of titling his motion to reargue in state 
court a "petition for habeas corpus." The state court then affirmed his conviction without opin-
ion. District Judge Knapp held that even if the affirmance without opinion indicated that the 
state court declared petitioner's error a procedural default, which Judge Knapp doubted, such a 
default ruling would be inadequate to bar federal habeas review. He observed: 
[I]napplicable to the case at bar is the "legitimate state interest" found by Sykes and its 
progeny in various state procedural rules. . . • There is no comparable state interest in the 
insistence that a paper, making cognizable claims and filed with the correct court, bear one 
particular set of words at its head. 
574 F. Supp. at 114. 
In Spencer v. Zant, 715 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1983), the petitioner while in state court had 
tried to challenge the minority composition of his petitjury. He raised the challenge during voir 
dire of that jury, but the state courts held that the challenge was not timely made under a state 
procedural rule requiring challenges to be made before the jury is "put upon" the defendant. 715 
F.2d at 1568. Petitioner's application for habeas corpus was denied by the district court, but the 
Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that Georgia's application of its procedural rule was inade-
quate to preclude review. The court noted that the procedural ruling was not well supported by 
prior state precedent, see notes 128-29 supra and accompanying text, but went on to say that even 
if it were, "Georgia's policy interests in enforcing its default rule in this case seem weak at best," 
because the trial court had been given "more than ample opportunity to correct the array with-
out wasting judicial resources." 715 F.2d at 1573 & n.11 (citing Henry v. Mississippi). 
In a thoughtful dissent in St. John v. Estelle, 563 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1977) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 436 U.S. 914 (1978), Judge Tjoflat, with whom Judges Goldberg and Godbold joined, 
asserted that Sykes: 
[does] not stand for the proposition that the failure to comply with a state's contemporane-
ous objection rule necessarily bars full habeas review of the petitioner's constitutional claim. 
Rather, it is the extent to which the state's rule is grounded on legitimate state interests and 
operates in a manner consistent with a defendant's right to a fair trial that determines 
whether a federal habeas court need defer to it. 
563 F.2d at 172. 
Dissenting in Runnel v. Hess, 653 F.2d 1359, 1366 (10th Cir. 1981), Judge Logan cited 
Henry for the proposition that the state procedural rule there involved was not adequate to bar 
habeas review because its enforcement would fail, under the circumstances, to promote a legiti-
mate state interest. Since the prosecuting attorney's remarks that formed the basis of the federal 
claim were "irremediably prejudicial," the state's interest in correcting errors at the trial level 
was inapplicable. See also Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 705-06 (4th Cir. 1978) (differ-
ing with the state's application of its own procedural rule when objection to an irremediably 
prejudicial closing statement appeared to serve no legitimate state purpose). Judge Murnaghan 
made a similar point in Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055, 1069-70 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 1004 (1980) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting), when he observed that "[t]he purposes of the rule 
favoring deference to a state procedural requirement [were] entirely absent" where the defend-
ant's claim was one of "general constitutional law, applicable in every case." In that situation, 
the state's interest in encouraging factual exploration at the trial was said to be attenuated, and 
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the establishment of the Sykes test, since both cases are informed by a 
common understanding. Sykes seeks to uphold state procedural rules 
for the many interests that those rules serve in their own right; where 
those interests are not remotely being served, Henry would mandate, 
and Sykes would permit, federal review. 
This partnership between Sykes and Henry can only be maintained, 
however, if the Henry approach outlined above is applied with re-
straint, so as not to undermine a state procedural rule where, in fact, 
some rule is needed. Rules by their very nature are only imperfectly 
tailored to individual cases, and Henry should not be employed as an 
intrusive, post hoc veto over state rules whose routine functioning will 
not allow them to apply with equal force to all petitioners. But if the 
very concept of "forfeiture" can rightly be viewed as "a theoretical 
model for weighing the defendant's interest in asserting defenses 
against the state's interest in foreclosing them," 151 it would seem the 
height of good sense and fairness to require, as would Henry, that 
something be shown to weigh on the side of the state. 
that interest was therefore inadequate to justify a forfeiture. Cf. Breest v. Perrin, 655 F.2d 1 (1st 
Cir.) (holding that state procedural rule served a legitimate state interest, and therefore was 
adequate to preclude review under Sykes), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1059 (1981); Cheek v. Bates, 615 
F.2d 559, 563 (1st Cir.) (observing, before applying Sykes test, that state procedural rule was 
reasonably well-tailored to state's substantial interest in truth-seeking function of the trial), cert. 
denied, 446 U.S. 944 (1980); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1217 (5th Cir.) (applying 
Henry formulation to default of fourth amendment claim before applying the Stone v. Powell 
"full and fair consideration" test), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977); Holmes v. Israel, 453 F. 
Supp. 864, 867 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (questioning whether Sykes should apply where state's policy to 
prevent "sandbagging" by defense counsel was substantially vindicated by counsel's motion for 
mistrial), ajfd., 618 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1980). 
151. Westen, supra note 30, at 1260. 
